


JPRS-WER-85-005

14 January 1985

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

14 January 1985

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

BELGIUM

- Gol on Cruise Missiles, Political, Economic Issues
(Jean Gol Interview; LE SOIR, 29 Nov 84) 1

DENMARK/GREENLAND

- Motzfeldt Explains Parliament Nuclear-Free Zone Declaration
(Erik Meier Carlsen; INFORMATION, 16 Nov 84) 5

POLITICAL

CANADA

- Canadian Intelligence Agency's Problems Aired
(Alain Borgognon; JOURNAL DE GENEVE, 3 Nov 84) 7

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Controversy Within SPD Over Buelow's Security Proposals
(DER SPIEGEL, 26 Nov 84) 9

GREECE

- Comments on U.S. Ambassador's Speech
(EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS, 23-29 Nov 84) 12

Colonialist U.S. Presence
ND, U.S. Attacked

- PASOK Reportedly Firm on Karamanlis Candidacy
(ELEVETHEROTYPIA, 20 Nov 84) 14

| | |
|---|----|
| PASOK Criticized on Erroneous Policies (ELEVTHEROITYPIA, 24 Nov 84) | 15 |
| PASOK-KKE Rift Seen Only Superficial (I. K. Pretenderis; TO VIMA, 25 Nov 84) | 17 |
| PASOK's Desire for Parliamentary Majority Termed Dangerous (ELEVTHEROITYPIA, 26 Nov 84) | 19 |
| Possibilities of Government-Inspired Electoral System (Giannis Fatsis; TA NEA, 25 Nov 84) | 21 |
| Poll Results on Youth Attitudes (Spyros Konstantinidis; ENA, 29 Nov, 6 Dec 84) | 23 |
| Leisure Time Preferences Stance on Authority | |
| Briefs Northern Ipeiros Ethnic Greeks | 29 |
| PORTUGAL | |
| Possible Resistance To Needed Reform Viewed as Threat (Jaime Nogueira Pinto; O DIABO, 4 Dec 84) | 30 |
| Leadership Crisis Predicted for CDS (Jose Miguel Judice; O DIABO, 4 Dec 84) | 32 |
| Military Cooperation Agreement With Guinea-Bissau (DIARIO DE LISBOA, 4 Dec 84) | 35 |
| European Parliament Members' Visit Seen as Intervention (O DIA, 5 Dec 84) | 36 |
| Jardim: No Advantage to Nation From NATO Membership (DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 20 Dec 84) | 38 |
| Briefs Pessimistic View of EEC | 39 |
| MILITARY | |
| EUROPEAN AFFAIRS | |
| Soviet Threat Seen Contained on NATO South Flank (Siegfried Thielbeer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 29 Nov 84) | 40 |
| NATO Seminar Airs Conflicts on 'Flexible Response' Doctrine (Robert Held; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 20 Nov 84) | 44 |

NORTHAG Capabilities in Forward Defense Role Examined
(Siegfried Thielbeer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 1 Nov 84) 49

Plans for European Fighter Aircraft Examined
(Rene van Druenen; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 29 Nov 84) 53

DENMARK

Leading Western Statesmen, Officials Question Credibility as Ally
(Nils Eric Boesgaard; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 18 Nov 84) 57

SACLANT Deputy Commander Defends Need for Subs in Baltic
(Nils Eric Boesgaard, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16 Nov 84) 61

Navy Seen Performing 'Perfectly' During Submarine Hunt
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 17, 18 Dec 84; AKTUELT, 18 Dec 84) 63

High Marks for Readiness, by Nils Eric Boesgaard
Possibly First of Many Violations, Editorial
Submarine Seen by Fishermen

SWITZERLAND

Daeniker on Army Size, Cost, Materiel
(Gustav Daeniker; DIE WELTWOCH, 22 Nov 84) 67

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

Firm Fears Loss of USSR Order as Result of U.S. Embargo
(B. G. Andersson; DAGENS NYHETER, 15 Nov 84) 72

ENERGY

FINLAND

Industry, Government Leaders Meet To Discuss Nuclear Power Need
(HUUVUDSTADSBLADET, 23 Nov 84) 75

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Navy Tasked With Oil Spill Cleanup in North Sea
(SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 12 Oct 84) 78

GOL ON CRUISE MISSILES, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ISSUES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 29 Nov 84 p 2

[Interview with Vice Prime Minister Jean Gol; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mr Gol, you have just had a heated altercation with the CVP [Social Christian Party] over the missiles. You appear to be becoming less radical on the subject.

[Answer] I have never been radical. I do not believe I did anything other than repeat the commitments made by Belgium. I have never said that we had to decide in December whether to install the missiles partially or totally. Nevertheless, that does not make my position ambiguous. You can look for ambiguity elsewhere. All the texts signed by Belgium clearly indicate that we will install the missiles if the Geneva negotiations fail. I then ask you: Have we reached any result in these negotiations? No. Shall we reach a result before March 1985, the date set for the normal execution of the missile redeployment plan? We shall see between now and March.

[Question] It will therefore be necessary to evaluate the negotiations in March?

[Answer] We can very well do so in March. If, at that time, the Russians and Americans decide to freeze the installation of missiles, then I would be the happiest man in the world. But if, in March, the Geneva negotiations were to show no results, then we shall have to do our part in the common defense effort if we are asked to do so.

[Question] Why have you taken such a hard line up to now?

[Answer] Because I have had the feeling that public opinion was truly being brainwashed about the beginning of a resumption of negotiations. They were trying to make people believe that this mere resumption of negotiations was enough to prevent the deployment of missiles. The attitude of these excessive optimists makes me think of the following story: A man was living in a room with eight other persons. When he could not stand it any more, he thought of committing suicide, but a friend told him to bring a goat into the room. As you can imagine, the situation only gets worse. Our friend then goes to the closest canal. On the way, he again meets his friend, who advises him to get

the goat out. "Then," he says, "you will feel better." The story is just like those who now think that the mere resumption of negotiations is so marvelous, when there is still no agreement on the essential. These optimists who deliberately practice wishful thinking pose another threat: that of tiring our American allies and of encouraging isolationist tendencies and withdrawal in the United States.

[Question] The CVP has just said that it wanted no missiles before mid 1985 at the earliest.

[Answer] It is the CVP and not the CVP ministers that made these statements not in keeping with the government's position. I have not heard Martens and Tindemans support this point of view. But I agree that the government would benefit by clarifying its position on the procedure that will be followed, before Martens' and Tindemans' visit to the United States, for they will have to explain to Washington the entire government's view.

Furthermore, if one thinks that the missiles will automatically fall out of the sky in March, then there is no automatism. But I repeat that there is a commitment on our part to make a decision in the direction I indicated.

[Question] You have also spoken of vote-getting tactics in the CVP.

[Answer] Matters of security and major international issues should be removed from election quarrels. If, in the weeks ahead, we were to yield to the pressures manifested by the Flemish side, then I predict a weakening of our international credibility. That would be a shame at the precise time when our economic and financial credibility has been restored abroad, despite the rather shameful Pegasus affair.

[Question] Is that a possible breaking point?

[Answer] It is absurd to speak about a breaking point when everyone has repeated that they wanted to govern together until the end of 1985. I shall therefore not speak about any break.

[Question] This quarrel about missiles seems to point toward a bad climate within the government.

[Answer] We are beginning the final year before elections and it is normal for every group to get in a position to win in order to enable the current majority to continue for a second term. I therefore do not believe that it is necessary to do so by attacking other ministers or the other parties in the majority. It is difficult to claim that one wants to continue until the end of this legislative session when one publicly gives signs of aggressiveness toward the other partner. That type of behavior is harmful.

Language Excesses

[Question] To whom are you referring?

[Answer] I shall give but one example: the way in which the young PSC [Christian Social Party] members behaved toward me this last weekend, in the presence of all the ministers and all the Social-Christian members of Parliament. I shall not make a personal issue out of it and I refuse to engage in a controversy by responding to their criticisms. But I shall take advantage of this opportunity to praise the parliamentary opposition, which has never demonstrated the language excesses of the younger PSC members.

[Question] But will that irritation not hurt the resumption of governmental action demanded nearly everywhere?

[Answer] It is an extraordinary demonstration of masochism to speak of a resumption when the majority still has enough business ahead of it to last the whole year! Members of Parliament even have enough on their agenda to last a whole legislative session. One should rather establish priorities among the issues already taken up before speaking of any resumption. They talk of a program on security, another on poverty, even the small and medium-size businesses. Let us rather look at the task which Parliament still has to accomplish. Anyone with any sense at all can see that there is enough business to occupy our time!

[Question] But there is also the ministerial shakeup that may bother you.

[Answer] Willy De Clercq in the Ministry of Finance will have to be replaced by a man who can inspire confidence at home and abroad. The PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] can bring that man into line if it wants to.

[Question] You are not a candidate then?

[Answer] I am not a candidate for any post, but for objectives for this government.

[Question] There remains the problem of the poor representation of French speakers abroad.

[Answer] There is real frustration among French speakers. But within the liberal family, agreement is possible so that the French speakers will have more to say on the international scene.

[Question] Then there is no PSC?

[Answer] If we have escaped the class struggle, despite the socialists, it was not in order to fall into the fight over posts with the Christians.

[Question] If you do not speak of a recovery, you do speak of a "detaxation."

[Answer] The budget inspection will take place in February. We shall then have to provide a plan to reduce taxes, one sufficiently ambitious to make an impact on public opinion. Even if the realization of this hope were postponed in time because of budget requirements, our plan must provide a shock and open up prospects for public opinion. I am a supporter of the five-point

plan presented by the PRL [Liberty and Reform Party, Walloon]: limiting the average rate of taxation to only 50 percent regarding wages. Exceeding that limit would shift us toward a socialist-type society. I would also like to go further with splitting. Likewise, we must reduce the taxes of those on the lower end of the scale, for such a measure would better express the idea of solidarity than new allocations.

[Question] The tax brackets must be indexed.

[Answer] And finally, we should develop a charter of the rights and freedoms of taxpayers regarding the tax collector. It is quite curious that the taxpayer is less well-protected than a common criminal!

[Question] What would the schedule be?

[Answer] We could do this in three or four years and begin on the occasion of the 1986 budget. If there is a way to begin sooner, we shall do so, but that does not seem very realistic.

[Question] What would be the budgetary cost of such a plan?

[Answer] The net cost would not be much more than 25 to 30 billion francs, spread out over 3 to 4 years. I say "net" because in such figuring, I consider the favorable impact on public finances of the boost to purchasing power thanks to lower taxes. Naturally, these sums must be offset by new reductions in spending (in social security, aid to enterprises, and so on). If we do not find such a sum, it is not even worth the trouble to begin to rehabilitate public finances.

[Question] But is it not contradictory to take allocations away from the people and then reduce their taxes?

[Answer] Why would I deny this shift. The government intervenes too much and does its job poorly. I am for a government that distributes less. I think that the liberal cultural revolution is underway, far beyond Reagan. The time is long gone when "leftist intellectual" was written as one word. Freedom is an idea in the wind that will make headway. Look at the books in the windows of all the bookstores. Liberals are cleaning up their language. The word "freedom" is regaining its meaning.

11,464

CSO: 3619/31

MOTZFELDT EXPLAINS PARLIAMENT NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE DECLARATION

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 16 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by Erik Meier Carlsen]

[Text] Nuuk, 14 Nov--Greenland is calling for a ban on nuclear weapons--even in wartime. The head of the Greenland government thinks this could affect reinforcement agreements.

"If Denmark's agreements with NATO make it possible to place nuclear weapons in the Greenland area in wartime, these agreements should be changed," said the head of the Greenland government, Jonathan Motzfeldt, speaking to INFORMATION.

On Wednesday the Greenland parliament approved a declaration rejecting the deployment of nuclear weapons and calling for a ban on sailing by or flying over Greenland territory in both peacetime and wartime.

The government coalition partner of Motzfeldt's party, the Siumut Party [socialist, radical home-rule party], the tiny left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit [pan-Eskimo party] (IA) placed nuclear weapons and nuclear energy on the agenda of the fall session of parliament. IA's chairperson, Henriette Rasmussen, referred to resolutions passed by the Greenland peace movement, Sorsunnata, and the international Inuit organization ICC [Inuit Circumpolar Conference] that call for a ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear power in the Arctic region.

Motzfeldt declined to speak on behalf of other countries or peoples, but said parliament has earlier rejected "utilizing Greenland for military purposes."

"This decision, which has been relayed to the Danish government, involves a rejection of nuclear weapons in the context of Greenland's territory," said Motzfeldt, who went on:

"Once again I would like to urge parliament to approve a formal declaration banning nuclear weapons in Greenland and therefore strongly opposing allowing the deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems on Greenland's territory and denying permission for nuclear-armed delivery systems to sail past or fly over Greenland's sea or air territory either in peacetime or in wartime."

The declaration received the unanimous approval of the parliament of Greenland and was sent to the Danish government, although Motzfeldt stressed that "such a statement must be coordinated with the foreign and security policy of the entire national community."

More Restrained on Nuclear Energy

Motzfeldt was considerably more restrained when it came to nuclear energy. He said that exploration for and charting of "mineral deposits" should be continued in order to provide the country's politicians with a "proper basis for making decisions."

But Motzfeldt said he could note that "so far most statements from political parties have been skeptical and restrained with respect to the utilization of uranium due to uncertainty as to the environmental and social consequences and it still seems best to adopt a wait-and-see attitude in this context."

6578

CSO: 3013/44

CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S PROBLEMS ATTEMPT

Geneve JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 3 Nov 84 pp 1,13

[Article by Alain Borgognon: "The Canadian CIA Is Having Its Problems"]

[Text] Four months after its creation, the Canadian Security Agency (counterespionage) is facing a rather annoying problem: the police force is refusing them direct access to its computers! That means, for example, that to find out who owns the car someone under surveillance is getting into, Canadian spies must make a written request to the police!

Exposed by the national press, this example is certainly not the only one. It is nevertheless all the more strange in that 90 percent of "spies" have come from the police force and their offices are still in the buildings of the Canadian Royal Police Force, the "mounted police!" It should be mentioned that until last June, counterespionage was the province of the federal police. No one in Canada is unaware of the fact that the top men in this police force were not very happy to see counterespionage taken away from them and given to a civilian department.

Besides its difficulties with the police, the Canadian Security Agency is encountering another problem: distrust by the press, by the left, by leagues in favor of rights and liberties and by hundreds of organizations from bishops to university professors. All are afraid that Canadian counterespionage would adopt the ways and customs of the neighboring CIA. "Our mandate is basically limited to two sectors: internal terrorism and industrial espionage," reassuringly explains the head spy, Ted Finn, a lawyer, father of four children and a practicing Catholic.

Everyone agrees on industrial counterespionage, or nearly everyone. It is the term "internal terrorism" which bothers people. The law which created the agency last June describes as a threat to internal security "those activities which aim at undermining the form of government constitutionally established in Canada." Theoretically, according to this statement, a republican or Quebec separatist is likely to be placed under surveillance. Groups opposing the measure fear that it would be an open door to all sorts of abuses, particularly against the rights of individuals, and they would like the law amended to read: "activities whose goal is the overthrow of democratic rule." The nuance is an important one!

What of the Rights of the Individual?

Distrust of the Security Agency also stems from the fact that its judicial framework makes no mention of the use of informers. In the past, the federal police had few scruples about "twisting the arms" of individuals who refused to work for them. People are also unhappy that none of the law's clauses stipulates explicitly that the Agency may not disregard the liberties and rights of citizens. On this last point, it is particularly surprising that this law was passed while Pierre-Elliott Trudeau was prime minister since he prided himself on being the champion of these individual rights. That would be forgetting too quickly that the ex-prime minister was also an advocate of the hardline view of "reasons of state," and was obsessed with secrecy.

In accepting his responsibilities, Ted Finn, as a good Catholic, was categorical: "I want a department that is clean, moral, not in subservience to political authorities, and which respects the rights of citizens." The future head spy also added: "I will turn in my resignation the day I am asked to do something contrary to the dictates of my conscience." So far, nothing indicates that Ted Finn has not kept his word. It must be said that the law which regulates his agency is there to help him. As a matter of fact, wiretaps or the opening of mail must be authorized by a federal court judge, and a three member committee--one for each of the parties represented in the Chamber of Communes--supervises the secret service. The purpose of these checks is to avoid the abuses and illegal acts of which police officers in the past were guilty, acts which--in the people's eyes--made the scarlet red of their dress uniforms pale.

In spite of everything, Ted Finn will certainly discover that it is not easy in a free country like Canada to run a department which does not have the full cooperation of the police forces, which is disparaged--from the word go--by the liberals, and which is subject, moreover, to many legal and political controls. In Ottawa it is whispered that the only problems that Ted Finn does not have are recruitment (the spy trade is popular) and--but this is not so certain--the Agency's budget!

9824

CSO: 3619/27

CONTROVERSY WITHIN SPD OVER BUELOW'S SECURITY PROPOSALS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Nov 84 p 31

[Text] Swelling conflict between Brandt and Vogel. They are having difficulty persuading the SPD to toe the same line on security policies.

The SPD leaders in Bonn were alarmed by urgent news. Alfons Pawelczyk, Deputy Mayor of Hamburg, and the defense experts Erwin Horn and Hermann Scheer challenged the party leadership to finally lay down the law.

Pawelczyk's warning was sent to Willy Brandt and Hans-Jochen Vogel. Horn wrote to Andreas von Buelow; Scheer, to Federal business manager Peter Glotz. According to general consensus, the SPD internal debate on security policies was considered extremely damaging to the party.

In fact, the SPD defense politicians have not been that divided for a long time. For 14 days they were concerned just with themselves and not with the CDU Defense Minister Manfred Woerner's risky armament plans.

What evoked the dispute that has been brewing some time now between the party and the parliamentary group was the work completed by Andreas von Buelow, the "Outline for a Federal Armed Forces Structure of the 1990's."

Buelow, who was Parliamentary Undersecretary in the Ministry of Defense under Hans Apel and is now chairman of the SPD's commission on security policies, had presented the outline to the public without prior discussion with his members of his party. The SPD members of the defense committee who were participating in a NATO meeting in Brussels first heard of this outline--von Buelow's "latest blow" (per SPD member of the Bundestag Horst Jungmann)--in a news report.

Buelow's maverick behavior not only annoyed party members, he also exposed the SPD's perplexity regarding security policies. You see neither Party Chairman Brandt, nor Parliamentary Leader Vogel quite know which way to go.

Supported by Brandt, Andreas von Buelow is working within the party leadership on a new concept of defense. He poses basic questions such as: Do the current analyses of potential threat still hold true? Must the West continue to incorporate warning time of up to 48 hours, in spite of improved reconnaissance systems.

Buelow has come up with noteworthy results. In the course of his investigations which he conducted with a small staff of experts, he found that NATO is by far not as weak, nor is the Warsaw Pact as strong as is portrayed by American Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and his West German colleague Manfred Woerner. According to Buelow, the analyses of potential threat to the Alliance serve more or less as justification for purchasing new weapons systems.

In Buelow's view, even the assumption that the West would need a warning period of up to 48 hours for mobilizing forces is no longer tenable. Before the start of the attack, the East must complete so much preparation that NATO would have sufficient time to fill out its units with reservists.

Only with great reluctance did the parliamentary group reconcile itself with Buelow's analyses. It accepted some of his points but found fault with the fact that the chairman of the commission would continually work without discussing issues with the members of the defense committee.

Unswervingly Brandt's pupil finally presented in mid November his most highly charged paper to date. It contains a concept for the armed forces in the 1990's.

Buelow wants to dispense with the magic number of 495,000 soldiers on active duty. For him, the decisive issue is not peacetime strength but wartime strength which currently lies around 1.2 million men. That's why he rejects Woerner's planned extension of the compulsory military service from 15 to 18 months and is urging a targeted employment of reservists. He believes that even with weapons procurement, radical changes are necessary. Defensive weapons such as anti-tank rockets must have priority over offensive equipment such as tanks.

At any rate Buelow considers the Minister of Defense's rumor of an active 495,000 man army as fiction.

According to Buelow, the armed forces are actually present only from early Monday morning til Friday noon. On holidays and on the weekends a type of reserve structure is used in which the soldiers currently serving are on call.

In Buelow's opinion the armed forces' ability to mobilize enough soldiers in the shortest period possible in periods of conflict and of defense so as to act as a deterrent is more important than peacetime strength. As presented to his associates, he calculates that a required strength of 300,000 men would be sufficient for peacetime.

However, this argument went too far for the SPD parliamentary group. Vogel had members of the defense and budgetary committee work out a paper that dispensed with wordy future scenarios but examined, point by point, the Minister of Defense's armament plan for the 1990's. The individual projects were noted with "legitimate need" and "decision not yet feasible."

Brigitte Traupe, the SPD reporter for the armament budget who is feared in Hardthoehe because of her hard work and fastidiousness, proposed additional cuts of 1.9 million DM.

But the Social Democrats hesitated at one important point; the only thing they could say regarding the planned extension of the compulsory military service was non-committal. In response to a motion by the arms experts Jungmann and Scheer to be more concrete, Vogel blocked it from coming to a vote. What remained was the vague formulation: "In any case, an extension of military service cannot be considered until other possibilities have been exhausted."

Jungmann and Scheer, however, do not want to resign themselves to this fact. The SPD cannot promote the elimination of nuclear short and medium range weapons and at the same time reject any extension of military service. If the structure and armament of the armed services is supposed to be based more strongly on conventional capabilities, then under the circumstances, the SPD must also say yes to "unpopular measures." And that means more soldiers and longer military service.

Scheer: "It is simply a matter of our credibility at home and abroad."

Apparently even the chairman does not know how the members are going to protect their credibility. When the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group spoke with soldiers not long ago and Willy Brandt was asked to respond to the question of where the SPD was heading, he had empty words ready. "I can assure you that the SPD in its new program will profess its loyalty in accordance with Godesberg to the defense of the country, the armed forces and the alliance."

12348

CSO: 3620/148

COMMENTS ON U.S. AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH

Colonialist U.S. Presence

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 23-29 Nov 84 p 32

/Text/ What U.S. Ambassador Stearns said recently, speaking at a luncheon in a major hotel, could be regarded as his business in the sense that he can express whatever views he wants regarding his country and its foreign policy.

Yet, since his speech coincided with the observance of the anniversary of the Polytechnic School and because he himself referred to it in order to express his "wonder" that the great march of the Athenian people ended in front of the U.S. Embassy and in order to claim that the U.S. had "no involvement" in the colonel's coup, we are entitled to say a few words--and that not even as a full answer.

Whether the American foreign policy is "founded on a group of democratic nations" as claimed by Stearns, is well known by the peoples of Latin America and was learned well by the Greek people during the 7-year dictatorship. And if the U.S. "is misunderstood," as he said, he must refer to the testimony of thousands of people and piles of data to find who is arming the juntas, what superpower has its secret services behind every coup and what monopolies steal the wealth of the people whose bloody regimes the U.S. calls "free world."

With regard to the American intervention in the 1967 coup, one--including Stearns--needs only to recall the decades of the colonial presence of the U.S. missions to Greece, the cooperation of the secret services with the putschists, the appalling depositions during the trials which followed the end of the dictatorship, the omnipotence of the Americans in Greece during the junta, and a lot more.

The reference of the U.S. Ambassador to the coup and the Polytechnic School was at least unfortunate for a diplomat who likes to appear as being "of good faith."

ND, U.S. Attacked

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 23-29 Nov 84 p 1

/Text/ Montague Stearns--end of the line. Whatever harsh words he may use against PASOK, he has been recalled by the Mitsotakis friends in Washington because he failed to "overthrow" Papandreou! Because, they say, he simply is not another Peurifoy.

Such a man is coming. Yes! His successor, they say, will be a hand-picked Reaganite so that, with a docile government here, he will place on a parallel Reaganite orbit our foreign and economic policy--in favor of Evren and "denationalization". All this is written in Athens!

One will say: is it possible after so many democratic struggles, agonies, adventures, tragedies and insults? Unfortunately, it is! They were wrong those who thought that Efialtis /Mitsotakis/ would turn the clock back only 20 years, the time of the junta-producing "mutiny" and of the governmental travesty. They were wrong. He will take us back 35 years when the Peurifoyes /the U.S. ambassadors/ not only appointed premiers and ministers but directors of government agencies and section chiefs of "important ministers." Why not!

Since the new "hard-line" ambassador, who will presumably spank Papandreou, has not yet come to Athens the deputies and politicians of the rotten ND who agonize over the "electoral lists" and other internal party problems must turn to the Greek and Turkish sections (yes, they are together) of the State Department! Their personal visits facilitate their "business". Regular flights on TWA. Those who do not speak English need not worry--they have lots of interpreters.

7520

CSO: 3521/101

PASOK REPORTEDLY FIRM ON KARAMANLIS CANDIDACY

Athens ELEVTEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Nov 84 p 9

/Excerpts/ In keeping with Greek political custom, which calls for a long electoral campaign, the whole of 1985 will be an "election year." Already the horizon is clarified by the government on controversial issues which the major opposition has tried and will try to becloud. These issues are: a) the election of the president of the Republic in the spring of 1985 and b) the new electoral law which will be introduced to the Vouli in January.

After the premier's statement in a recent interview there is no longer any doubt that PASOK will vote for the re-election of Kon. Karamanlis as president of the Republic.

No doubt the re-election of the president will receive the votes of the two major parties in the Vouli, in which case there will be no reason to diss'e it and call for an election in the spring. Therefore, the effort of the ND to involve the president in the political conflict has gone flat. The president himself does not favor friction and tries to preserve a political equilibrium.

Nevertheless, this important choice of the premier for the re-election of Karamanlis encounters certain opposition within PASOK, which, however, is not going to appear openly. A sober assessment indicates that such opposition should not come out into the open. The main argument is that A. Papandreou must remain in the premiership another 4 years in order to chart the course which was not charted and to implement all that was not implemented and remained mere promises until now, and also to prepare for the succession in order to assure smooth political developments. Moreover, the presence of Kon. Karamanlis in the presidency is useful in many ways for PASOK--at least for those who understand the reasons.

Finally, if Papandreou were to move to the office of the president he would deprive PASOK of the certainty of winning in the parliamentary election.

7520

CS0: 3521/102

PASOK CRITICIZED ON ERRONEOUS POLICIES

Athens ELEVTHERTYPIA in Greek 24 Nov 84 p 9

/Excerpts/ The impressions from the Elounda meeting are still fresh. The meeting was certainly a personal, international success for Premier Papandreou.

However, it is worth noting that there is a lack of balance between the government's considerable initiatives in foreign policy and its dealings with "domestic problems." This imbalance is often admitted by the premier when he so often sees the need for shifting attention to the domestic issues.

All of us, so many fortunately, who spent our lives "for a new birth"--to quote poet Kostis Palamas--have the right to criticize "from within" the PASOK government. This criticism, however painful, is done with objectivity, not with a critical disposition.

In any event, we must note a series of government actions which have a negative effect on the government's activity as well as on public opinion:

The first is the government's insistence, after 3 years in power, to resort to the alibi of blaming the past for whatever the government does or does not do, for what failure or inefficiency it is responsible. The effort to shift responsibility by using this argument--sound during the first year--is totally wrong now as we enter the fourth year. Anyway, even if it were justified, it would not work because the public does not buy it.

The second is the vacillation of government policy. Measures are being adopted or laws enacted only to be revoked or set aside in part or totally a few months later or even a few weeks later, with the result that the government's policy often appears contradictory or ill-prepared in many critical sectors.

It is possible that the government is of the opinion that by so doing it prevents public displeasure, but this is a wrong view because such a tactic harms its prestige and creates a more general climate of insecurity.

The third relates to the fact that the government--however strange it may seem--continues to act as though it is in the opposition. It continues to

promise much more than it can deliver, something which is not only very risky but which also undermines the government's credibility.

The fourth relates to the selection of individuals for important positions at the local, regional and national levels who have neither the necessary prestige nor the skills, and who inevitably are rejected by the public. Equally negative is the effect of having extra-governmental, partisan centers of power where certain individuals act on the basis of petty interests and objectives at the expense of a responsible long-range government policy.

The fifth covers the overall spectrum of our relations with the Americans, where a large segment of the people sees no difference in the policy followed by ND.

The premier has coined the phrase, "shifting sand," for the moving section of the electorate. This shifting sand could have been won over for good if the government trusted less its rhetoric and shifted its weight where the domestic battles are decided--economy, administration, education, etc. Many sound proposals founder in the swamp of bad implementation, while populist expediency smothers critical steps for reform or renewal.

7520

CSO: 3521/102

PASOK-KKE RIFT SEEN ONLY SUPERFICIAL

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 25 Nov 84 p 4

/Article by I. K. Pretenderis: "The 'Key' in the Relations Between PASOK and Communists" /

/Excerpt / Three years of the communist Left in our country; three years of PASOK in power; and yet the "declared" heirs of the October Revolution only now have started timidly to "test" the validity of their policy of cooperation /with PASOK/ and the moratorium /in their opposition to the government/.

Their rhetoric has taken much stronger tones of criticism than those of 1981 or 1982. The center of this rhetoric has shifted slightly; KKE no longer suggests that "the Change cannot be accomplished without KKE;" now it aspires to prove that "the Change cannot be done by PASOK."

Here is the key to this assessment: The inability of the communist Left to develop an autonomous political expression compared to that of PASOK, and especially its inability to give an autonomous, convincing, and realistic answer to the problem of power, has condemned it in the past--and condemns it now--to play the role of a "leftist pressure group" against the government and the governing party.

PASOK answered this question with the "here and now," the "possible", and the "charismatic leader" Papandreu, while the traditional Left spent its time analyzing, with disagreements, the various roads to socialism.

Reduced to the role of a pressure group the communist Left could only struggle to keep its separate identity, at least what each person considered as a separate identity.

It is not an accident that KKE has waged a major political fight in the past few days by insisting on parading with "red flags and hammer and sickle banners" at the Polytechnic School demonstration.

Within this context we must now assess the change of tone in its criticism. This context also determines the limits.

To begin with, the communists do not hide that they are worried about this story of "broadening PASOK" and the "opening to the unaffiliated voters of the Left"--mentioned by the premier--who are being "courted" by everyone. At least for the moment these worries do not seem to be justified. Both communist parties find with pleasure that no significant "outflow" is taking place toward the "committees for supporting the government's work."

Then, we have the electoral law, and with it the major question of PASOK's majority in the next legislature; consequently the question of the communist's participation in a coalition government. Thus, the question of power is openly raised. But the communists succeed in turning the electoral law into a major point of contention with the government, but without giving at the same time a clear, convincing and realistic answer to the problems it creates. Raising the electoral system to a matter of principle does not relieve the communists of the obligation to clarify "what follows after that."

Of course, no one knows how proportional the next electoral system is going to be. At the very least it will assure the presence of more communists in the legislature. However, even when they demand a "simple and pure proportional" system, the two communist parties, presumably, would not object too much to a system similar to that of West Germany--the so-called "system with two ballot boxes." In other words, even on the question of the electoral law there is some room, if not for an agreement, at least for "mutual understanding."

This is more so, since the "cooperation" is not a mere concoction of the communist leadership nor a "Moscow directive" as those who search everywhere for a "Soviet finger" seem to think. The cooperation results from a reality which developed during the 7-year period of 1974-1981 when PASOK and the two communist parties "governed together" /Note: led together/ a large part of Greek society, from Local Self-Government to the universities, from the trade unions to all kinds of associations that blossomed in the post-dictatorial period. This has led to a very wide complex of relationships--even at the psychological level--which does not leave much room for disagreement.

But nothing rules out a hardening of the criticism as the election comes closer and closer. With polarization being certain, and with the harsh political climate which is expected to prevail, the communists are getting ready. On its part, PASOK does not seem to suffer too much from the intensity of the traditional Left's rhetoric. This communist "second front" frees PASOK from the communist association which Mitsotakis would certainly use to his advantage during the long electoral period which is coming up.

7520
CSO: 3521/101

PASOK'S DESIRE FOR PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY TERMED DANGEROUS

Athens ELEVTHERTYPIA in Greek 26 Nov 84 p 9

/Excerpts/ In choosing the new electoral system which is about to be introduced in the Chamber of Deputies /Vouli/ the PASOK government is guided by its desire to win an absolute majority of seats in the legislature. This was clearly stated by Premier Papandreou himself.

The argument that the new electoral system will assure the representation of all political trends in the electorate is merely a weak alibi for PASOK's inconsistency in its pre-election declarations; besides, the current electoral system of reinforced proportional does not rule out the possibility of having representation of all trends during the first distribution of votes. The extent of this representation is limited only by leaving the smaller parties out of the second distribution.

Clearly, the tiresome search for a new electoral system does not aim at enabling the smaller parties to be represented in the legislature. Such talk is for the naive.

Simply, today's reinforced proportional system does not assure the first party a comfortable majority of seats in the Vouli because the forecast is that the difference between the first and second parties will be small. For this reason, the effort now is to give the first party a lion's share through a different electoral system. In other words, the search is for another "reinforced"--a variation of the reinforced and not a system of simple proportional, as we are told. That's the plain truth and all the rest is naive sophistry.

The political problem involved in this search is not the consistency or inconsistency of PASOK with its declarations. This is not its first inconsistency nor is this the first inconsistent government. The real political problem comes from the declaration of the PASOK leadership that a condition for stable governments and smooth political development is for one party to win a comfortable majority of seats in the Vouli.

If this view of parliamentary self-sufficiency is accepted by the electorate, the result will be a more rapacious system than the more excessive form of reinforced representation. Then even the most honest simple proportional

system will be unable to overcome it. The theory of self-sufficiency as a condition for normal political development is dangerous (in the present political conditions in Greece as some argue) precisely because of these smooth developments and the consolidation of democracy. It is dangerous for the following reasons:

--It divides the electorate into two fronts and intensifies their confrontation, leaving no margin for cooperation or necessary political compromises.

--It perpetuates the post-civil war view of excluding the communist Left from participation in governing the country.

--It forcibly smothers the political and ideological pluralism in Greek society and feeds the dynamic activities of non-parliamentary elements.

--It imposes silence and submission on all political trends in the electorate to the will of the single partisan leadership.

--It leads to the creation of a single-party state mechanism.

--It cultivates the seeds of arbitrariness and arrogance of power and autocracy in the state and party.

A Necessary Explanation

These and many other evils derive not from a self-sufficiency won by a party for what it is, for its programs and ideology; but from the self-sufficiency which is won by a party which uses the fear of an opposition victory to blackmail the voters. This is exactly what PASOK and ND seek today. The first with the induction of the anti-Right into PASOK, and the second with the unification of all anti-Marxist forces.

Therefore, an honest treatment of the "Greek political problem" is one which does not hinder smooth democratic political development and which does not lead to explosive crises. The "Marxist danger" or the "rightist danger" are less dangerous than the political anomaly which will result from the confrontation between the two parties for the sake of their majority of seats in the Vouli.

The PASOK government should allow, in the name of democracy, the free appearance of all by using a pure system of simple proportional and without blackmailing dilemmas. Then we may have a "fragmented parliament", but one which will at least function.

7520

CSO: 3521/102

POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT-INSPIRED ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Athens TA NEA in Greek 25 Nov 84 p 1

/Article by Giannis Fatsis: "Possible Participation of All Parties in the Second Distribution of Votes"/

/Text/ The system of simple proportional now being prepared by the government allows all parties to participate both in the first and second distribution of votes.

With regard to the first distribution, there will be no limitation. All parties will be able to participate provided, of course, they have received the minimum "electoral quota."

All parties can also participate in the second distribution provided they have won one seat in a constituency where they have an undistributed surplus. The condition for winning at least one seat is related directly to the electoral strength of a given party in a specific constituency where the undistributed surplus remains.

1. For PASOK the requirement for winning at least one seat presents no problem. It is considered certain by the governing party that it will be stronger than the ND in the provincial constituencies. In the 1981 election PASOK did not win seats in only two electoral constituencies: Lakonia and Kastoria.

2. The ND will have a problem for participating in the second distribution because it may not win any seats in several constituencies. This is because the signs from the provinces are not favorable to the Right. Even the ND leader is aware of this--last Wednesday he told the ND Parliamentary Group that "we are not doing well in the countryside." In 1981 the ND did not win any seats in Evrytania, Zakynthos, Kefalinia, Levkada, and Grevena.

3. KKE is given the opportunity to develop its forces in those constituencies where it has a hope of winning a seat. Already it has won seats in Athens, Salonika, Piraeus, Magnisia, Lapisa, and Mytilini. If it has large unused surpluses in these constituencies it can win additional seats in the second distribution of votes. In fact, it is possible that KKE may win seats in additional areas where it missed the quota in 1981 by a very small margin.

PASOK will fight to win the number of seats required to have an absolute majority in the legislature so it can form a self-supporting and viable cabinet.

On a Single Sunday

Provided that this will be the electoral system, then the election will take place on a single Sunday.

But if in the end this system is not definitely accepted for reasons that cannot be assessed at this point, there may be a possibility that the election will take place in two rounds--on two successive Sundays.

The (alternative) system being studied by the appropriate committee of the Ministry of Interior is a variation of the method known as D'Hondt.

7520

CSO: 3521/101

POLL RESULTS ON YOUTH ATTITUDES

Leisure Time Preferences

Athens ENA in Greek 29 Nov 84 pp 51-52

/Article by Spyros Konstantinidis/

/Excerpts/ Greek society is mirrored by the big picture of a Greek family. The father (the state, government or universities) knows that "something is not going well" with his children. He knows that his relations with them are not at all good but he does nothing to improve them. He prefers saying, "They are young; some day their brains will cool off."

Until at some point the newspapers write about "15 young people, 16-18 years of age, burst into a disco club, destroyed it and beat up and seriously hurt 10 persons, all members of a rival gang...."

Nevertheless, just as everybody likes "to make a lot of noise about other matters" and will not face up squarely to the problems of youth with society, these same people break out into sorrowful cries when the explosion comes.

A significant exception to the rule of silence was the important initiative taken by the Deputy Minister of the New Generation. About a year and a half ago, the ministry had proposed to the EKKE /National Center for Social Research/ to conduct an in-depth survey on the "leisure time, inter-personal relationships and values of youth." The conclusion of the survey, that was concluded in February 1984 and that was conducted on the basis of modern scientific methods, will constitute the first important sensitivity test of all the factors of Greek society.

What would be the reaction of the political parties when they learn that young people are the least bit interested in party festivals? What does it mean for society as a whole when the first thing young people ask for in their inter-personal relationships is sincerity? What does it say for the cultural level of modern society when 30 percent of young people did not read a single book or only book over the past year?

In the survey, the first phase of which was conducted in the greater Athens and Piraeus area, the following EKKE personnel were involved: Aliki Mouriki, Giannis Pyrizakis, Thodoros Paradollis, Olymbia Passa-Gardiki and Afroditi Teperoglou.

In their preliminary report, the survey personnel pointed out that "conducting the survey was not at all an easy matter." After many adventurous incidents, specially trained interviewers using the questionnaire method, questioned 548 boys and 563 girls whose age breakdown was as follows: 424 boys ages 15-19 and 124 boys ages 20-24; 419 girls ages 15-19 and 144 girls ages 20-24.

As revealed by the survey, two recreational areas got the highest percentages for young people's preferences: (1) disco clubs, tavernas, pubs, cafeterias, confectionary shops, bouzouki places and nightclubs where preferences ranged from 30 to 53 percent; and (2) movies in the number one spot followed by concerts. Source of the money used for entertainment purposes was pocket money allowances given by parents to the younger girls and boys and work for the older ones.

Only one of three young people between 20-24 years of age watches television on a daily basis. This percentage is, of course, not at all flattering for the quality of programs offered. This becomes at once evident when it is realized that those who do watch television do not look at regularly scheduled programs. They only look at movies and news programs. As revealed by a previous survey, the news programs attract television viewers not because of the quality and news worthiness of the programs but they are merely a cheap substitute for newspapers. Even here, what attracts the Greek television viewer and particularly the younger ones more than anything else is the "picture from abroad and international life in general."

The satisfactory and unsatisfactory surprises come from the young people's contacts with radio and reading. They adore the former while they loathe the latter.

Disappointments arise over young people's involvement in reading. One third of the boys of all ages did not read a book or else read only one book during the past year. Only a very small percentage (12 percent) of boys and girls living in Athens read at least 10 books last year.

The complaints of book publishers are not to be shared by newspaper and magazine publishers. Here is what the EKKE interviewers had to say about young people's involvement with newspapers and magazines:

"Magazines, contrary to books, are being regularly read by young people of both age groups. Eight to 10 boys ages 15-19 read magazines, a percentage that drops significantly in the 20-24 age bracket (64 percent). The percentage of girls ages 15-19 who read magazines is slightly higher than that of boys and much higher in the 20-24 age bracket.

"About two-thirds of young people ages 15-19 and over three-quarters of young people ages 20-24 regularly read political newspapers. We should also note that in the 15-19 age group, more boys (10 percent) than girls (3 percent) have never read a political newspaper, a difference that disappears at the 20-24 year bracket.

"Sports newspapers are regularly read by 34 percent of boys in the 15-19 age group, compared to only 7 percent of girls in the same age group. These figures drop even further in the 20-24 age group (22 percent for boys and 3.5 percent for girls).

"Interest in domestic and foreign political matters is especially strong among youth. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the two age groups. About 50 percent of youth ages 20-24 are regularly informed on such matters, while the corresponding percentage for young people ages 15-19 ranges around 30 percent. The primary source of information on political matters is the radio, television, the daily press and magazines."

The survey report mentions that "one would have imagined more young people joining clubs and organizations." Adolescent boys do join clubs, indeed 64 percent do. However, they are sports clubs only. Over half of older boys are members of student associations.

What makes up the daily life of young people are not political organizations or cultural clubs but get-togethers among friends and colleagues. Fifty percent of young people take part in such get-togethers made up of between six and 10 persons who meet on a regular daily basis, especially as far as boys are concerned.

The slap on the wrist of political youth organizations is heard more resoundingly by "the indifference shown by young people over various festivals sponsored by political parties and their youth organizations."

Joining a political organization appears to be a thing of the past although interest in politics remains strong.

The "get-togethers" now have the word and if we were to believe the beloved new generation composer D. Savvopoulos "they are writing history" in our country.

Stance on Authority

Athens ENA in Greek 6 Dec 84 pp 51-52

/Article by Spyros Konstantinidis/

/Excerpts/ The recent explosive encounters of a segment of youth with various authorities --police, political parties, associations-- have brought to the forefront the problem related to young people's relationship with what in their eyes represents authority, namely teachers, parents, police, supervisors, employers and politicians.

The EKKE survey contains authentic and exceptionally interesting information on the picture youth has on authority and its representatives in general.

The first significant conclusion of the survey is that the high school teacher no longer has the important influence he once had on forming the character of his students. If we were to accept the view that young people do not admit by whom they are being influenced so as not to lay themselves open to their parents' charge that "they are being led astray" by influences outside the family, then we once again have the conclusion that the authority of the teacher is declining in comparison to the relative recent past.

Nevertheless --as revealed by the survey-- young people's opinions of their teachers is rather favorable: an average of one-third of both boys and girls ages 15-19 see them as friends of youth (we do see some difference in girls, the percentage of whom is lower than the corresponding percentage of boys). Also, a significant percentage (42 percent of boys and 46 percent of girls) expresses a view of favorable neutrality vis-a-vis teachers.

The percentage of youth influenced by teachers as to their fundamental choices in life, such as the direction of their studies and ideological orientation, is rather low. First in the degree of "disobedience" toward their teachers are boys: less than 30 percent of boys stated that they accept some influence in the choice of studies and profession. On the other hand, girls appear more obedient in these two areas.

The conclusion of the survey should be studied with great care by the Ministry of Public Order. This is so because "the majority of youth believes that the police show discrimination during the exercise of their duties either systematically or opportunely." The EKKI interviewers stress, "Here are two interesting points: First of all, quite a few young people --especially girls-- do not voice an opinion on this question. Secondly, among those who do have an opinion and is voiced by girls 20-24 years of age believe in a greater percentage than all others (42 percent) that the police often show discrimination, while very few girls agree that they never do discriminate."

Also, it is characteristic that about 60 percent of young people ages 20-24 continue to believe that the principal target of discrimination by public order agents are --despite the significant political and social changes of the last decade-- the "simple people," the economically and socially weaker classes, the politically opposed, individuals who, nonetheless, are integrated into our social system, while the classic categories of non-integrated ones (anarchists, persons of ill-repute, those living on the margins of society, etc.) do not constitute --in the eyes of the youth-- the primary target of the public order agents. Young people ages 15-19 give fewer complete answers but the basic premise remains the same.

One of three young people ages 20-24 have a very bad opinion of politicians. They view them as individuals who seek to promote themselves and to satisfy their various ambitions. During the interviews, one in 10 young people used very strong language to describe the broader political leadership of the country, saying that it is "mediocre and corrupt." Still, a surprising end to the idyl of political leaders with youth, an idyl that was registered in the political slogans of the 1974-1984 decade with the joint theme "Kosta or Andreas, remember, the youth is with you," etc. etc.

What does today's youth think of open-air political gatherings: The following table says it very eloquently:

| | Ages 15-19 | | Ages 20-24 | |
|---|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls |
| They leave me indifferent | 32.2 | 27.0 | 18.8 | 14.7 |
| They should be prohibited | 2.3 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| I am indignant because they occur often | 2.8 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 2.1 |
| They constitute a lawful right of the citizens | 41.7 | 50.0 | 49.6 | 51.0 |
| It is one of the more substantive forms of struggle | 21.7 | 20.0 | 29.9 | 31.5 |
| Total: | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The degree of indifference of youth toward open-air gatherings and marches of a political nature noticeably drops at an older age while, on the other hand, the acceptance of such meetings and marches as a significant form of struggle increases with age. It is also noteworthy that adolescent boys possess at a greater degree than others feelings of indifference or opposition. Nevertheless, the majority of young people have a positive view overall (63 to 83 percent, by categories) for this way of gaining economic and political demands.

In both the decades of the 60's and 70's the dominant problem in relations between youth and society was the so-called generation gap. It seems that this gap has been closed in the present decade. Indeed, the EKKE interview team's first observation was that "what at first is impressive is the fact that an overwhelming majority of both boys and girls of the two age brackets, i.e. ages 15-24, say they have good relations with both parents (the percentage ranges from 69 to 91 percent).

National priorities are identified in the consciences of youth with the problems of the young people. Specifically, over 40 percent of those questioned consider the first national priority to be the solution of the problem of youth unemployment. The same problem, "the spectre of unemployment and financial deprivation" are considered a very important problem, especially by that age group that is entering the job market (20-24 years of age).

The second problem for both sexes is national security and defense. The third problem is that of the economic crisis. If something makes a special impression it is the fact that for the youth of the present era the description of the problems of society does not differ from that of the older citizens, with perhaps one exception, namely narcotics which are not considered dangerous for youth.

The coming of age of youth perhaps shows in the following table which describe "what problems of their generation continue to remain unsolved."

| | Ages 15-19 | | Ages 20-24 | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | No.=356 Boys | No.=328 Girls | No.=117 Boys | No.=144 Girls |
| Unemployment, economic problem | 49.7 | 40.2 | 59.8 | 66.0 |
| Generation gap | 11.5 | 24.1 | 2.6 | 9.7 |
| Education, improvement in studies | 14.9 | 15.2 | 14.5 | 9.7 |
| Entertainment, recreation | 7.0 | 5.2 | 1.7 | - |
| Narcotics | 3.9 | 5.8 | 2.6 | 6.3 |
| Other | 11.4 | 6.6 | 17.3 | 6.3 |
| No answer | 1.6 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

When young people reach the work age it is observed that their unemployment is not due to the deficiency of their education but to the more general economic problem.

What appears, even in an indirect manner, to be the priorities recognized by the young people themselves are the following: the acquisition of their own private dwelling, the improvement of dwellings they now have and the purchase of an automobile. This is the dream of one of four young people. Asked what they would first do if they had the necessary money, very few --especially boys-- left any room for the achievement of certain romantic desires. Most hastened to say that they would first of all see to it that certain basic material needs be met. Thus, after housing and an automobile, coming in second place, with quite a difference in boys, was the setting up of one's own business and the acquisition of investments and savings. On the other hand, girls preferred trips and excursions.

5671

CSO: 3521/117

BRIEFS

NORTHERN IPEIROS ETHNIC GREEKS--Ioannina University Professors D. Loules and G. Malakasis spoke last night at the Nikaia Smirnaion Union about the "paradise" in Albania where 400,000 Northern Ipeiros ethnic Greeks live. The audience consisted mainly of KKE followers. The Albanophile professors pointed out that "the Greeks living in Albania are not being oppressed, the Greek language is being taught freely, there exists cultural centers which are envied by many of our provincial cities!...and the Greeks have the same rights as the Albanians and every opportunity for advancement..." The discussion that followed was moderated by Vice Mayor Vera Nikolaidou. At some point in the questions and answers session citizen Thomas Venetis asked: "How can we visit Albania since its borders are closed?" Vera Nikolaidou gave...the enlightening answer: "We do not know. Apply to the embassy..." The blatant attack against North Ipeiros by Albanian agents in Greece has generated a panhellenic anger. But according to an ND announcement, the government's tolerance of the celebration of the Hotza regime at the time when no mutuality is implemented and thousands of ethnic Greeks in Albania are being exterminated, has created a still greater fury. /Text/ /Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 22 Nov 84 p 5/ 7520

CSO: 3521/102

POSSIBLE RESISTANCE TO NEEDED REFORM VIEWED AS THREAT

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 4 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by Jaime Nogueira Pinto: "The Coming War"]

[Excerpts] Indications of the system's decay and the nation's deterioration multiply daily. Portugal, in the sad and weary faces of its people devoured body and soul by poverty and hopelessness, in the battered facades on streets eroded by neglect or filthy with idiotic graffiti, looks like a conquered and occupied land, ready to disappear into history before the amused condescension of the cynical and the foolish euphoria of the stupid, the two dominant strains in the politico-intellectual class that "made" the 25 April revolution and unmade the nation.

It is the end, the one we have predicted from the beginning, the logical, irreversible, irremediable end of all societies that defy the minimum standards of truth and reality and are governed by rules contrary to historical experience and the common good. It is an end, with neither recourse nor appeal, of a regime and a system that will not be missed, but that with posthumous vengeance are capable of leaving no stone on top of another.

It is even too late for the more drastic "reformist" solutions, such as the populist candidacy of an Alberto Joao Jardim, the only one of the political class who speaks publicly and irreverently about the "sacred cows"--such as the parties, the parliament, the media--the things that nearly everyone is thinking but has not yet dared to proclaim in public, out of respect for personal feelings.

But even if the Madeiran leader were to pass the rigorous screening of his fellow PSD [Social Democratic Party] members, who continue to err and to drift, amidst endless sensitivities and in-fighting, it can be asked whether he could overcome the machinery of established interests and, if he should win, whether he could accomplish anything, with all the weighty inertia of a Byzantine system of socialist poverty.

Among candidates of a populist and nonpartisan cut such as Jardim and Pintasilgo, Soares will not have strong prospects of reaching the second round. By the time of the presidential election the economic, financial and social situation will be much worse yet; the system of accelerated manufacture of currency may already have begun, to delay the state's bankruptcy. A public already bled and sacrificed

will be asked to make further sacrifices, with neither sense nor future, because they will be made to benefit a moribund and worthless cause--the regime.

Coupist and conspiratorial tendencies, fed by an uneasy conscience and idle hands, are being reborn and are multiplying among the "military left" and the highly useful "party of the workers." With the undeniable strategic capability they have always demonstrated in military-civilian coordination and in poisoning public opinion through "agitprop," these forces are depending greatly on an "irreversible event"--the crisis and the breakdown of institutions--seeking, as in 1974, to take possession of the theme and the desire for change, while indefatigably destroying the major obstacles in civilian society and in the military institution, the forces and personalities that may be opposed to a new Goncalvism, which can only be more oppressive and bloody than the first, as it is now dictated by desperation and panic.

So we shall witness, from now on, varied and concerted initiatives:

Against the military institution and the present hierarchies, seeking to divide, confuse and neutralize the armed forces, leaving a free field there for leftist conspirators.

Against what remains of private initiative and free enterprise, insisting upon the imbecilic but attractive slogans proclaiming that it is the "capitalist comeback" (and not decolonization and socialism) that are the cause of the present degradation and misery.

Against the church, which has gradually assumed a position as moderating power and voice of justice and that, in 1975, was the main barrier to the nation's communization.

Against patriotic and nonpartisan organizations, groups and personalities, seeking their "civic death" and their isolation from the public.

It will be a sordid war, full of intrigue and poison. But being able to confront it and win it is a necessary condition for any national solution, which means that we must immediately prepare and mobilize for it.

8834

CSO: 3542/70

LEADERSHIP CRISIS PREDICTED FOR CDS

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 4 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "The Crisis in the CDS"]

[Text] Everything seems to indicate that the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] is about to enter a period of some turmoil, now that the congress marked for the end of February is approaching. The meeting of the National Council, which coincided with the similar meeting of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and was for this reason somewhat overshadowed, was marked by an open controversy that polarized Lucas Pires, president of the Political Commission, and Azevedo Soares, president of the Directive Commission, and the confrontation seems to have reached a rather high level of aggressiveness. The situation is relevant especially because of the functions performed by the two politicians and because of the political solidarity that has characterized them for several years, including the fact that Azevedo Soares joined the CDS at the request of Lucas Pires when the latter was elected party vice president in the aftermath of the collapse of the PS [Socialist Party]/CDS government.

The solidarity between the two has been genuine, although it is not possible to conceal two very different styles of conducting politics and even two distinct positions in regard to questions such as that of Eanism. Azevedo Soares, for instance, was one of the men in the CDS who fought hardest for Soares Carneiro, while Lucas Pires always made sure that an unmistakable and critical aloofness was maintained. Azevedo Soares was always in the front line of the struggle against political and sociological Eanism, while Lucas Pires allowed the idea to be spread that he didn't view the role of General Eanes in so negative a form as did many others.

Now that Ramalho Eanes has virtually ceased to be a figure of even minimal political interest and seems condemned to become the head of a small, somewhat diletantish party on the left, the conflict between the two politicians--who personally are still good friends, by the way--comes to the foreground. The roots of this conflict, however, remain linked to the question of Eanism, it would seem. As a matter of fact, Lucas Pires proposed that the CDS ask the president of the republic to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic, which objectively would help create the environment necessary for presidential intervention, which eventually could save Ramalho Eanes. Azevedo Soares headed the struggle against that idea, which also happens to be related to the question of deciding how to act in relation to the central bloc now that it is in its epigonous phase.

The conflict was resolved, as is usual, through the proverbial capacity of Gomes de Pinho for logical reasoning, managing once again to work out a political formula that avoided putting Lucas Pires in a bad situation. But what is relevant is not that a conflict broke out or that it was eventually resolved. If that were anything especially serious, where would the PSD be by now! The politically significant issue is that for the first time there occurred a substantial political split between two of the exponents that generated the drive that led to Lucas Pires' leadership of the CDS 2 years ago.

And the timing of this episode could not be worse for Lucas Pires. On the one hand, because the CDS continues to slip and slide without showing any capacity for the growth that would lead to its being expected to play the leading role that would come up to its leader's expectations. On the other hand, because the crisis between Azevedo Soares and Lucas Pires could generate the possibility that in the former, and for the first time in 2 years, a viable alternative to Lucas Pires emerges, around whom opponents could unify who themselves have shown little capacity for disputation.

The "Freitist" group, Adriano Moreira and his allies in various districts, Basilio Horta and some half-dozen faithful, Joao Morais Leitao and a fistful of liberals--all this forms an anomalous mass politically difficult to federate against Lucas Pires. In such situations history shows that it is through an internal schism in the power bloc that conditions can be created for an alternative. It could thus be conjectured in theory that the problems of Lucas Pires really began 1 week ago in the National Council meeting.

Problems, yes; but not insoluble problems. In the first place, because, in spite of everything, Lucas Pires has a capacity for logical reasoning and support in certain sectors of the press that are substantial (see the strong support of the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS or of EXPRESSO, curiously during a weekend in which the "Soarism" of the latter became quite patent). In the second place, because Lucas Pires retains a decisive trump, and that is the definition of an appropriate strategy that serves, as it recently served Mota Pinto, as a factor of party unification.

Problems, in spite of everything, that arise at the worst moment politically for the evolution of the Portuguese political system. In fact, at the time when the turnaround of the PSD and the rise to internal power of those who are opposed to the central bloc comes about, a simultaneous internal crisis in the CDS could be highly prejudicial to creation of a viable alternative to the central bloc. For all these reasons, and one more (which is the existing electoral system), without a combination of the forces of the PDS and the CDS it is not likely that the results can be achieved in the local elections, in the presidential elections and possibly in the legislative elections that can overcome the situation in which we are now bogged down.

For this reason it would be helpful if the CDS were capable of showing a vitality and an internal unity that would function as a determinant factor in creating better conditions for a political turnaround.

This is the time--and will be publicly for 2 more months--for the CDS to oppose en bloc and without distinctions the PS and the PSD. But the real capacity of a

political leader is also measured by what he is able to sense in the winds of the movement. The CDS congress will be won--because it must be so--by whoever is able to wield the banner of CDS unity and of creating a new social bloc that can be an alternative to the central bloc and that can also bring about an integration of the nonsocialist parties. For those such as I who are in the PSD and always asserted that the CDS is indispensable for relauching the current regime, it is secondary to know who leads it, but to know in whose name the CDS is led. But this is still a time for waiting. We shall see how the centrists overcome the endemic crisis in which they seem to be sunk and to what extent they will be capable of being present when the real combat begins.

8834

CSO: 3542/70

MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH GUINEA-BISSAU

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 4 Dec 84 p 6

[Text] Several agreements involving training of military personnel were signed yesterday in the capital of Guinea-Bissau yesterday between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau.

The personnel, to be trained within the scope of the agreements signed at the end of a visit by a military delegation from Lisbon to Bissau, will attend Portuguese military schools in the fields of health, administration, accounting, physical education, electricity, electronics, hydrography and military justice.

Brig Gen Artur Mesquita, chief of the delegation, viewed the visit as "reactivation of contacts" halted for about 2 years for reasons "external to Guinea-Bissau." The visit was made at the invitation of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP) of Guinea-Bissau, within the scope of the bilateral cooperative programs defined by the Portuguese State Secretariat for Cooperation.

Col Mammadu Djaloh, who is responsible for training of FARP personnel, told ANOP [Portuguese News Agency] that the contacts with the Portuguese military delegation are the beginning of a cooperation that "in the future will be expanded at all levels."

Brig Gen Artur Mesquita revealed further that a delegation of "highly specialized" Portuguese officers is to go to Bissau very soon for cooperative action in "very specific areas."

The visit went "marvelously, in fact exceptionally, well," the chief of the Lisbon military mission stressed.

The training activities covered by the agreements are to begin early in 1985. Within the terms of this agreement, Portuguese military men will train a Guinean military unit.

8834

CSO: 3542/70

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS' VISIT SEEN AS INTERVENTION

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 5 Dec 84 pp 12-13

[Article: "Foreigners Interfere in Portuguese Courts"]

[Text] Since the arrival in Portugal of four European deputies (one German, one Greek and two French), here to "investigate" the conditions and the reasons for which Otelo and the other alleged members of the "25 April People's Forces" have been arrested, the propaganda function of this operation has been explained to our readers. We have, in fact, emphasized the interference of these foreign representatives in the Portuguese courts, the effrontery with which--in a press conference--they have called into question the Judiciary Police and the examining judge, as if Portugal were a "banana republic."

Attention was called to the fact that no one would dare foster or facilitate Otelo's escape, as the ex-commander of the COPCON [Continental Operations Command] must be tried and the court must pass sentence in good conscience and in accordance with the Penal Code. For this purpose, Otelo has a defense attorney. No one is aware of a special amnesty law for Otelo: that would put the magistracy itself in a bad situation, because if the facts against Otelo are proven it must be borne in mind that they /did not occur/ [in boldface] in a time of social disruption, popular uprising or state of pre-civil war. If they are proven, the facts were verified in a full state of law and in full normal functioning of institutions, in freedom and in democracy, whether or not in accordance with the system.

We think a good job was done in reconstructing the nation's moral image. Corroborating our position about the arrival of these deputies, the Attorney General of the Republic [PGR] published an official communique, in which it is mentioned that "at the press conference and in the interviews they granted, these representatives and those accompanying them made statements in which they tried to inculcate the idea that "there are disquieting details," that the case is "marred by numerous irregularities," that it is a "perfectly vacuous" and "surrealistic" dossier, indicating "political persecution of both Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and of the other approximately 50 persons arrested."

The communique goes on to say that the Attorney General of the Republic "in fulfilling its responsibilities for legal procedures and defense of the courts' independence, regrets that these representatives, in the name of alleged concerns in European institutional circles, have been permitted to interfere in the

operation of the Portuguese courts and announces the following: the criminal case initiated against Lt. Col Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and others is in the final phases of the investigation, and it is expected that the Justice Ministry will consider an indictment before the end of this month."

The PGR goes on to say that "the next time that secrecy is lifted by the Justice Ministry /it will be verified/ [in boldface] to what extent the assertions are correct or whether they are no more than irresponsible statements. As these assertions have not achieved their intended objective--the magistracies will continue to act with the independence, objectivity and freedom for which they have been recognized--this attempt at influencing public opinion and discrediting the function that the Constitution and the law entrust exclusively to the courts must be denounced."

8834

CSO: 3542/70

JARDIM: NO ADVANTAGE TO NATION FROM NATO MEMBERSHIP

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Dec 84 p 3

[Text] Alberto Joao Jardim stated yesterday in Funchal that he is not convinced that NATO's presence in Portugal is useful.

The president of the regional government affirmed yesterday at the Madeira Regional Assembly that "to date, NATO has not succeeded in convincing me that the existence of the Alliance is useful."

"In 1974 and 1975 we were threatened with the establishment of a communist dictatorship, but our allies did nothing to help us," Jardim stated, adding that Sa Carneiro "was never an unconditional partisan of NATO," a position which he said he shared.

He said that NATO's solidarity can only be demonstrated if Portugal were to be made the beneficiary of a type of Marshall Plan, adding that the way the Nkomati agreement was implemented "is a failure of Portuguese foreign policy." He further stated that "solidarity seen in purely military terms is useless."

Responding to Mario Aguiar (PCP), who protested Joao Jardim's affirmations, he said that "in civilized Europe the most extreme form of colonialism is being practiced, founded on Soviet troops." He added that the Soviet Union is a threat to peace in the European continent.

Interrupted by the denials of the communist deputy, the president of the Regional Assembly noted that "the crosses next to the Berlin Wall are the sign of the freedom cry denied to the citizens of the countries annexed by the Soviet Union."

CSO: 3542/73

BRIEFS

PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF EEC--The socialist prime minister of Greece seems to have gone too far in the way he draws money from the EEC. After all, one must always retain a certain degree of decorum, which Papandreou this time seems to have forgotten to respect. Completely lacking in finesse, he was specific: either you give me more money or I block expansion. He later corrected his language and insisted "only" upon the need for the EEC to establish a program of compensations for the Mediterranean countries to offset [the results of] expansion. The differences between the "Atlantic" and "Continental" sensibilities that run through the EEC are apparently being joined by another, opposing Mediterranean countries to Atlantic countries. There are beginning to be more of the little differences to which Europe has become subject. But it is above all the reality of this Europe of the EEC that gives emphasis to the words of the Greek leader Papandreou--that each one grab as much as he can. [Text] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 4 Dec 84 p 20] 8834

CSO: 3542/70

SOVIET THREAT SEEN CONTAINED ON NATO SOUTH FLANK

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Nov 84 p 12

/Article by Siegfried Thielbeer: "In the South, NATO Feels Strong--A Visit to Mediterranean Armed Forces Headquarters"/

/Text/ Naples, November 1984--The Soviet Union has been unable to substantially improve its position in the southern NATO area in the past few years. The supreme commander of the NATO armed forces in the south, U.S. Admiral Small, thinks that developments in Italy, Greece and Turkey allow one to hope that the region definitely can defend itself.

In Naples, enveloped in rain clouds, where the headquarters of the NATO armed forces in the south (Afsouth) is located, the admiral and some staff officers explain the situation in the Mediterranean area. Traditionally a U.S. admiral, who at the same time commands the U.S. naval forces in Europe with headquarters in London, is NATO supreme commander in Naples. Small spends most of his time in Naples, among other things to show how seriously the United States takes this job in the alliance. The national function is discharged by his deputy in London. The commander of the ground forces (Landsouth) is always an Italian four star general with headquarters in Verona. The naval forces (Navsouth) are also under the command of an Italian, an admiral. With a British vice admiral as his deputy, he has his headquarters quite close to Admiral Small's, as is the case with the commander of the allied air forces, who traditionally is a U.S. lieutenant general. In peacetime only air defense units, missile units and fighter planes are under direct NATO command; the other armed forces are placed under the command of the integrated command only in the case of tension or in war.

The tasks of NATO in the south are enormous. The defense area extends 4,000 kilometers from west to east, from Gibraltar to eastern Turkey, to the border with Iran and Iraq. The distance from the North African coast in the south to the fringe of the Alps in the north is 1,400 kilometers, or the distance between London and Moscow. Overland routes between the possible fronts, if they exist at all, are sparse and primitive. Austria and Switzerland separate the "Europe Center"

Modernization programs are said to have been initiated in all NATO countries. At NATO headquarters it is reported, albeit not openly, that there is excellent cooperation with France, which is not formally integrated in the command structure. Joint naval and air maneuvers, it is said, are the order of the day, and operational principles have been coordinated, on the basis of a "memorandum of understanding." At every level, cooperation has to be obtained anew from the French Government, and the time needed for the decision is included in calculating maneuvers. At any rate Soviet planners can be in no doubt about what action France would take and about the computers of the French air forces being connected with the NATO early-warning system.

Much more bothersome are the constant disputes between Turks and Greeks. But the Americans have learned, and now generally dispatch the Italians as mediators. It is virtually impossible to prepare maneuvers acceptable to both sides, for the Turks demand that Lemnos not be included while the Greeks insist on it. A great deal of this, however, is ostentation. One almost ought to be glad that this conflict exists, says a high-ranking U.S. officer, for what a quandary Papandreou would be in if he did not have this convenient diversion from domestic difficulties! Questioned about the latest refusal of the Greeks to participate in joint air maneuvers, an Italian general says in a blase manner that, strictly speaking, the Greeks in fact participated in the maneuvers--by intercepting the Turkish and U.S. fighter planes. That was great practice, he notes.

According to Admiral Small, there are no grounds for worry that the United States is weakening the Mediterranean area at the expense of the Rapid Deployment Force--in other words, of crisis areas in the Pacific. Of course, he says, the United States is a problem for NATO only if a conflict in other areas encroaches on the alliance. And in that case the scenarios give priority to the NATO tasks.

In his one-and-a-half years as supreme commander, Admiral Small says, calmly drawing up a balance sheet, it has become clear that NATO no longer neglects the defense of its southern front. NATO is in a position to do more than preserve the balance of forces as long as the NATO countries continue the initiated modernization--in other words, as long as the Turks equip their air force and tank troops with new materiel, the Greeks continue to spend as much money for their armed forces as in the past and modernize their air forces and, as is to be expected, the Italians too adhere to a real growth of 3 percent.

In the past the "southern flank" (the expression is not customary here) has long been neglected, but now the southern command is receiving its appropriate share of NATO expenditure. AWACS early-warning aircraft has made a lot of things easier, replacing particularly in the south the ground

NATO command from the southern region. Afsouth has three land fronts--northern Italy, which can be reached from Hungary through the Gap of Gorizia, the Thracian region in northern Greece and of the Dardanelles, which the Soviet Union would have to conquer from Bulgaria to gain access to the Mediterranean, and eastern Turkey.

In all, 18 countries with a population of more than 310 million people border on the Mediterranean.

More than half of petroleum deliveries to Europe use the Mediterranean. More than half of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union is conducted via the Mediterranean area. The Mediterranean separates the NATO area from the restive peoples of North Africa. At the same time it is a connecting taxiway between the NATO countries. Sizeable shifts in forces and supply deliveries are possible only by sea. NATO must therefore control the sea. For Moscow it is sufficient to disrupt the enemy's maritime routes.

With about 38 to 42 men-of-war, of which only one-fifth are operational, the Soviet naval squadron has remained the same size for years. As a rule nine submarines of the Echo II, Victor and Charlie types are part of it. Occasionally conventionally powered ships of the Juliett, Tango and Foxtrot types are added. In the event of a conflict, the officers of Admiral Small's operational staff explain, one has to figure on reinforcements particularly from the Soviet northern fleet. The surface ships of the Soviet Union hardly cause any great concern, however. According to Small, the missile cruisers and destroyers are not exactly the best thing the Soviet Union has to offer. In the Mediterranean, he says, the naval formations of NATO excel those of the Soviet Union by a ratio of 3 to 1, and in this area NATO at least in part enjoys superiority in the air.

A greater threat is posed by Soviet submarines. Siting them and defense against them is particularly difficult in the Mediterranean for physical reasons. Mines can be laid from submarines and merchant ships and from the air. The Russian Black Sea fleet is said to have an inventory of about 85,000 mines--a considerable threat, which is also effective psychologically.

The greatest danger, however, looms in the air. Soviet Backfire planes can reach virtually all of the Mediterranean area--in other words, also NATO naval units and air bases in the south. For modern fighter planes, too, Italy and the Aegean Sea are within range. Numerically, the air superiority of the Eastern bloc is two-and-a-half-fold. NATO headquarters, however, relies on the highly developed training of Western pilots and the firm promise of reinforcements from the United States. "We can bring here more than the bases can in fact absorb," says a high staff officer. The vulnerability of the bases is the main concern, he points out, and supply maintenance and communications have to be improved.

NATO SEMINAR AIRS CONFLICTS ON 'FLEXIBLE RESPONSE' DOCTRINE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Nov 84 p 11

[Report by Robert Held: "Is the Alliance Becoming Too Checkered?--NATO Problems Discussed at a NATO Defense College Seminar"]

[Text] People sometimes forget that NATO is a successful political institution and that some thought has to be given to how it can continue to be successful. This is done from time to time also by confirming or newly formulating its strategy--as has just happened. But to make whole populations familiar with the basic lines of thought--that is a task which has not been solved so far. So one tries at least to inform intermediaries, and this probably was the idea of a seminar about NATO strategy conducted recently by the NATO Defense College in Rome. The 50 participants were a checkered lot, ranging from U.S. Senate advisers to German members of parliament to a Turkish admiral. General Mack, the German four-star general at the NATO Supreme Command (deputy supreme allied commander, Europe) started things off by expounding once more the basic realizations concerning the current state of the alliance. Only the united forces of Europe and the United States, he said, can ward off blackmail. Armament was not the cause but the result of tension. The on-going debate was oriented too much toward the question of armament and weapons systems. What was being neglected was the fact that NATO was a political alliance. The basis of NATO security policy was still the Harmel paper of 1967. That meant that to this day there was no substitute for "flexible response" or graded deterrence. Europe needed the strength to resist a conventional attack but also deterrence through the nuclear weapons in U.S. hands.

Nor can these functions of the nuclear weapons be replaced by the latest-technology weapons, the general said. Europe is faced by a twofold superiority of the Soviet Union--a conventional and a nuclear one.

So far, so good. This point of view of course includes an advance strategy; the ability to intervene in the deployment in the enemy's rear area is part of the conventional deterrence. This has now been announced as a NATO doctrine, as it were, but it would be easier to make it comprehensible to the populations if they learned more about Soviet plans. Yet not even at this seminar were the impressive details which are known internally unwrapped.

Meanwhile this problem of getting the assent of the populations to certain strategies or certain weapons systems has emerged in the Bundestag anew in the debate about chemical weapons. Aside from good wishes concerning abolition of these weapons, nothing concrete bearing on the present dilemma has emerged. It is certainly apparent that the East is chemically fully armed and that the West has nothing with which to oppose that. In other words, if the East were to launch a chemical attack, the West could only give a nuclear reply--and hardly anything has been said about that in public so far. "We have no deterrent against chemical weapons," said General Mack in revealing this logical gap in NATO policy. The Soviet forces are fully trained for operating with gas masks; the Western ones are not. In other words, they are not even prepared for passive protection. An American said that an air base without protection against chemical weapons was no better than a Mercedes without spark plugs. A possibility being considered is the storing of new chemical weapons in the United States and keeping them ready as a deterrent (the old ones being regarded as antiquated). Meanwhile the word is that chemical weapons are as bad as nuclear ones, that the population cannot be protected against them, and consequently the only deterrent that remains is a nuclear reply.

Conventional Attack the Main Concern

A distinction often confused by amateur strategists of the peace movement is the one between first strike and first use (of nuclear weapons). NATO has no authority for a first strike--that is, starting a war with a nuclear attack. The whole political structure of the democratic West makes that sort of thing impossible. On the other hand, first use--utilization of nuclear weapons when the enemy's conventional superiority no longer permits any other defense--is a component of "flexible response." But as regards the unquestionably horrible first strike, the political imbalance between West and East is a factor. What is simply impossible for the West might certainly be considered by a ruler in the Kremlin: to give the order for a nuclear first strike. "We should not underestimate the Soviet ability to do that," the general says.

Yet the main concern is directed toward the first days of a conventional attack--toward being able to resist it, to ward it off. Should the other side score great initial territorial gains, one would also have to be afraid that the loyalty of the armed forces of the satellite states in the Warsaw Pact would be strengthened, that a factor which otherwise would benefit the West would be eliminated.

It is inevitable that such a discussion primarily devotes attention to the weaknesses of NATO, starting with funding and expensive organizational deficiencies. Three types of tanks with three different guns need three kinds of ammunition. Air defense and communications connected with it are weak. The rest anyone can figure out himself; everyone recalled the sermons of General Rogers warning that we were not spending enough money for defense.

After the day with General Mack, the discussion became more varied, and in turn less clear as far as conclusions were concerned. Hearing all that (and impressions are similar elsewhere), one had to agree with the assertion

of an American that NATO was in a "let a hundred flowers bloom" period. The counterpoint consists in the fact that the strategy of "flexible response," including advance defense, even more obviously turns out to be the right thing.

Among the deliberations which cropped up, most revolved around the main problems. The actual NATO frontline is the line running right across Germany, from the Baltic Sea to the Austrian border. "Elastic defense" would be the right thing but for obvious reasons cannot be recommended. The opposite, an offensive advance defense, a "deep attack" in its extreme execution, apparently is not even supported by anyone in the United States. To prepare for a war of the new technologies is still considered utopian, for one thing because of the cost and for another because of its dependability. The system of deterrence against a conventional attack is to be simple, but it is also to be cost-effective--for example, to force the enemy to spend an amount several times as large for weapons to successfully carry out such an attack.

But the Warsaw Pact in any case has many more forces in readiness than would be necessary for mere self-defense. So the West does have to come up with something in order to raise the threshold of costs for the other side to an unacceptably high level. But by what means? On this point there cropped up the idea of the big obstacle, a Maginot Line of some kind or other right across Germany, a barrier against a surprise attack. This is received with relaxed skepticism by Germans who remember that the Maginot Line was rendered strategically worthless or that an enormous fortification, Fort Eben Amaal in Belgium, was even taken by storm--in other words, that there are just as many arguments against fortifications as for them--and who moreover think about the domestic political situation. Vis-a-vis the Soviets an obstacle line across Germany would be possible as far as cost-effectiveness goes but impossible politically. Yet the idea has not yet been discarded, for the concept that one might gain some "warning time" hits the main sore point. In all deliberations it is primarily a question of preventing an end of the world--that is, of arriving at decisions and clarifications primarily to avoid misunderstandings leading to a nuclear escalation. As far as the end of the world is concerned, it was stated that there is also still the balance of a "second strike," of retaliation from both sides.

A Briton warned with refreshing precision against all "scenarios." Thinking in terms of scenarios is primarily an American passion, which is bound to make the military nervous from time to time. True, "what happens if" is a component of all analytical planning, but in the past few years there has again been growing skepticism concerning scenarios, and also concerning game theories and the like--a scepticism based on life being full of surprises which will even escape fifth-generation computers.

Thus the idea of a Maginot Line in this case was assessed as a kind of superfluous clever thinking, the argument being that such a line was a piece of strategy per se and thus inevitably changed the rest of the strategy. The disinclination thus was not directed toward a certain infrastructure but toward the "strategic line." Unfortunately the French were not represented at this seminar, for their Maginot Line still exists in its main works and

can still be used as a legacy. The thinking about obstacles at the border of the Warsaw Pact, which happens to be the inter-German border, therefore may not have been concluded as yet.

What advance strategy entails was not explained; since surprise is an essential element, a number of things probably will never be publicized. Thus the concept of the "airland battle" doctrine once again was not sufficiently clarified here, or it was assumed that everyone knew that the propaganda against this doctrine was based on a misunderstanding which turns an operational doctrine for the command or larger units into an "aggressive" forward deployment strategy.

Doubtlessly advance strategy has to do with what somewhat ominously is called "ET" (emerging technologies), for of course "deep strike" does not mean an invasion by large formations into Warsaw Pact territory. Rather what is at stake is to paralyze an enemy advance in depth. This is where the superior air defense of the Warsaw Pact has changed conditions. Therefore strong skepticism was voiced about the plan for a fighter aircraft of the 1990's which would cost 30 million dollars and which would be boarded by a pilot with a white scarf. However, no one can assess as yet what expense will be required for "deep target detection" and "deep interdiction"--precision reconnaissance of the rear echelons by sensor satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and by intervening in the rear area with something other than manned aircraft, namely missiles and cruise missiles.

This means that when it is a question of threatening the enemy's lines of communication in the hinterland (the formations of the second echelon of the Soviet armed forces would come from the western military districts of the Soviet Union), the accuracy of aim of the new missiles and cruise missiles would suffice for attacking stationary targets (such as air bases and bridges) even if the attack against them took place only with conventional warheads. However, there does not yet exist any technology for striking mobile targets on the ground from distances of several hundred kilometers.

This is where electronics are supposed to play a part in that the data of flying sensors will be transferred immediately to advancing missiles ("real time targeting") or in that a "software" attack interferes in the enemy's electronic systems. Finally the laser is regarded as a contribution to the modern battlefield--not to speak of the "artificial brain" of computers. The U.S. Civil War and World War I already produced innovations which appeared fantastic at the time; now such things are to be created in order to avoid war, and to make that acceptable to the populations of the West is the problem of the West--even in Reagan's America.

And this brings one to the grand SDI (Strategic Defense Initiatives), better known as "Star Wars." Experts have no doubt that the project is feasible, and that alone enhances the position of the United States, financially and strategically. But this also means a change in theory which cannot yet be fathomed. If, for instance, a satellite killer system can destroy a reconnaissance satellite, a conventional weapon becomes a strategic weapon interfering in the nuclear balance.

Here, it appears, the Rubicon consisting of certain technological skepticism among Reagan's advisers has been crossed. One adheres to the objective, if only in order to hold a big trump in the negotiations with the Soviets. The question always is what is politically possible--in this case, within the United States.

An interesting armament economy deliberation concerned the fact that too much money was being spent for platforms--aircraft or ships carrying weapons systems. This criticism is directed particularly against heavy fighter aircraft but also against the Western navies. The Soviets, it is stated, started more than 10 years ago to cram their ships full of good weapons. However, warnings were also voiced against the momentum created by weapons manufacturers themselves who every time a system is about to be put in service already try to sell the next one. The word now is that it is better to improve existing systems with all available new means and thus, for example, to maintain the fighting capacity of a type of aircraft for decades.

What about worries and weaknesses of NATO? They emerge in such discussions, ranging to the opinion of the former Dutch defense minister who called for a nuclear-free zone and the illusionary concept of a Dane about the next detente.

The Role of the WEU

Was it possible to gain any general political impressions? The conference of the WEU foreign ministers which began in Rome at almost the same time did not meet with a positive echo here. The attempt to turn the WEU into a substitute defense community appears to be particularly unpopular with the Americans; a European diplomat considers it to be a superfluous maneuver by Genscher. On the other hand it was precisely in this circle that a concern behind this attempt--to attract the French again--appeared urgent. It was paradoxical anyway to conduct these seminar discussions without the French, who, especially behind the scenes, still have a lot to do with NATO.

Finally mention must be made of a worry which was not talked about but emerged indirectly in this colloquium, namely that gradually (note the attitude of the Netherlands in the question of the stationing of missiles) everyone is arranging his own special status in NATO--the Danes, the Dutch, the Greeks, the Spanish, not to speak of the French, the nonintegrated partners of the alliance.

This also has to do with the real difficulty of the Atlantic alliance, the impossibility of completely convincing the population of the meaning of NATO. This derives from the logic of the strategy of the alliance. "Flexible response" or graded deterrence is an "open end" logic, a thought system without any clear conclusion. Uncertainty is part of the plan, and that is an internal contradiction. It is hardly possible to make that kind of a philosophy palatable to the banal demands of democratic politics. On the other hand, it offers a wonderful target for attacks by imprecise peace philosophers such as the German writers.

NORTHAG CAPABILITIES IN FORWARD DEFENSE ROLE EXAMINED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Nov 84 p 12

[Article by Siegfried Thielbeer: "Forward Defense is the Name of the Task. Sir Nigel Bagnall and the Northern Army Group"]

[Text] A few kilometers west of Moenchengladbach, in the midst of forests and parks, lies a piece of England: the joint headquarters of British ground and air forces in Germany. The commander of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), Gen Nigel Bagnall, in keeping with NATO tradition, is also commander of ground forces of NATO's "Northern Army Group" (NORTHAG), just as the commander of British air units in Germany is also commander of the 2nd Tactical Air Fleet of the Allies: they wear "two hats," as it is called in NATO parlance--one national, the other Allied.

Sir Nigel certainly has no easy task. Four corps are commanded by the NORTHAG commanding general in case of mobilization or war, each provided by a different country: from north to south, beginning at the Elbe River, these would be the Netherlands 1st Corps, with three armored infantry divisions; then the German 1st Corps, with three armored divisions and one armored infantry division; then, from Hannover to the Harz Mountains, the British 1st Corps, the combat arm of the BAOR with three armored divisions and one infantry division; and then to the south as far as Goettingen (where the command area of the "Central Army Group" (CENTAG, Heidelberg) begins), the Belgian corps with two divisions. In addition, there is a U.S. brigade near Bremen, the advance unit of an American Reforger corps of two divisions, whose heavy equipment, i.e., tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, has already been stockpiled. Except for the Americans, therefore, Sir Nigel is dealing with four national units. This requires diplomatic skills as well.

General Bagnall points to the continuous strengthening of conventional Soviet military might, the growth of armored artillery, the combat capability of the combined arms, the introduction of combat helicopters in large numbers, the increase of electronic warfare means, the improvement of logistics, the strengthening of chemical weapons, tank and engineer equipment arsenals. "Soviet armed forces are prepared for the attack. Why this increase in offensive capability, if not for a surprise attack?"

A "surprise attack" does not mean an attack by forces as presently deployed, in the middle of peace, for Sir Nigel. Despite the many military debates in the East over the significance of deception and surprise in wartime. The East as well would not be really prepared under circumstances such as these. Weaknesses in the supply system, in the command staffs, a lack of motivation among field forces--all these things would mean substantial risks for the planners. The superiority would not be large enough to guarantee decisive strategic success. Even if both sides mobilize fully, the defender has a good chance: "A densely manned defense front is also capable of holding out against numerically superior forces." The BAOR, for example, would then have grown to 150,000 men, the German 1st Corps to 135,000 men, formidable forces for securing, in each case, a front ca. 60 km wide plus the rear area.

What worries Bagnall is the danger of an attack following a relatively short period of preparation, after a partial mobilization in the East, and in conjunction with appropriate political preparation. In a situation such as this, the U.S. might be tied up elsewhere, and the West might be divided and undecided. The warning signs are then perhaps not clear-cut, and the mobilization can be masked by maneuvers.

Under such circumstances, many a Western government, if for no other reason than not to increase tensions through a countermobilization, might be reluctant to make the necessary decisions. The Soviet Union, too, would probably not be able to withstand a long conventional war. According to Sir Nigel, Moscow has its own problems with its "allies" that should not be disregarded, it would have to take into account the superior economic power of the U.S., and, if one includes Asia, it would be in a two-front situation, in which a quick decision in the east, in Asia, could not be reckoned with. Thus, if the Kremlin wanted to risk a war at all, then--in a situation similar to that of the German Reich in World War I--it would first have to seek a decision in the west, in a surprise Blitzkrieg. Schlieffen's dilemma, Bagnall is convinced, is also that of the Moscow strategists.

In this situation, only as large a number as possible of available and also combat-ready Western units can have a deterrent effect. Cadre units which will only be brought up to full strength by reservists, troops who will have to be moved over long distant points, might arrive too late. The East is led into temptation by this, and could entertain the dangerous hope of underrunning a Western buildup by means of a surprise attack.

The North German plain, the area between the Harz Mountains and the Elbe River, is considered by military men as a classical attack axis. Unlike the CENTAG, which during a defensive action could make extensive use of mountain barriers, many sections of the flatland are considered favorable for tanks. The strategic mission of NORTHAG is forward defense. Having to stand up to the enemy as far to the east as possible can only be viewed by all commanders as a sensible directive, says Bagnall. Fervently, the British general warns against an overinterpretation of forward defense, however. To string all brigades like pearls along the most advanced line, a uniform distribution of forces along the intra-German border, irrespective whether a heavy attack is imminent here or not, could only lead to disaster,

like all Maginot thinking. The attacker always enjoys the advantage of determining the time and point of main effort of the offensive, and decisive local superiority and the associated danger of penetration by enemy forces always exist. And friendly forces are then dissipated at the wrong place.

For that reason, Bagnall pleads passionately for giving the defense mobility. Strong reserves must be available to intervene at the decisive attack axis. This does not mean a withdrawal to more easily defensible lines, such as the Weser River, perhaps, as was at one time proposed in earlier plans. Also Bagnall knows that the possible depth of defense in North Germany is extremely small. On the contrary, it means that, once the direction of the hostile attack has been determined, friendly forces will themselves seize the initiative as early as possible, and the mobility and flexibility of the highly mechanized friendly troops will be utilized. A purely static defense, which would definitely make sense at some points, must in the long run end in defeat of the numerically inferior forces--even if it remained a war of attrition.

The West must be economical with its weak forces. But even the inferior force can, through a concentration of forces--Clausewitz already taught this--achieve local superiority at selected points and in this way surprise the enemy. Sir Nigel thus pleads for more mobility and flexibility in operational planning: One must conduct the defense in depth, operate elastically and be able to form points of concentration of one's own, not only try to block the enemy frontally but outmaneuver him, attack him at the flanks or from his rear, hit him with counterattacks at his weak points. Mobility and concentration--and, along with the latter, risks as well--these are the prerequisites for disrupting the plans of the adversary. Only by seizing the initiative oneself can one force a course of action on the attacker.

Suspicions that such thoughts or similar plans, such as the Rogers plan or the American airland-battle doctrine, might be a disguise for NATO offensive planning or even preventive war or first-strike thinking are firmly denied by Sir Nigel: "NATO is a defensive alliance. An attack by the inferior West would be militarily absurd and politically impossible. There are no NATO plans--and the Soviet Union knows this too--for an offensive. There is only a plan for the concentration of forces for the defense."

The strategic plan of Bagnall definitely makes sense to the German commanders. From the beginning, the Bundeswehr was established as a mobile, heavily armored fighting force, capable of mobile defense and of counter-attacking. German officers point out that Bagnall's line of reasoning also strikes at the former British propensity for static defense, dug in behind minefields. General Chalupa, the German NATO commander of Central Europe (CINCCENT), Bagnall's superior, said during the maneuver "Lionheart" that he too welcomed the trend toward greater tactical mobility in the defense.

Only by being flexible, by overcoming the defensive mentality, and determining the law of action oneself, thus the upshot of Bagnall's thinking, can one increase one's own capability for conventional defense and raise the nuclear threshold. Only in this way would one's own strategy be credible and thus deterrent.

The West would definitely be capable of actions; the East, too, has its weaknesses. We asked the British general if he, as a Soviet commander, would risk an attack against the West. The answer was unequivocal No, and it was given without any trace of smugness.

12689

CSO: 3620/145

PLANS FOR EUROPEAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT EXAMINED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 29 Nov 84 Supplement p 4

/Article by Rene van Druenen: "European Fighter Aircraft Should Not Be Visible On Radar; A Smokeless Supersonic".

/Text/ Requirements of the German Air Force submitted for laying down the Outline European Staff Target

| | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Operational life | 6,000 flying hours |
| Availability | 6-8 missions a day |
| Time between missions | 20 min |
| Empty weight | 9,500 kg |
| Maximum T-O weight | 18,000 kg |
| Payload | 4,500 kg |
| Take-off distance | 500 m |
| Landing distance | 500 m |
| Maximum speed at 11 km | Mach 1.8 |
| Ceiling | 16 km |
| Instantaneous rate of turn at 3 km | 28 degrees/sec |
| Minimum turning circle | 500-400 m |
| Operational range | 500 km + 1 hour |

Within a few months the Dutch Government will have to decide whether it will participate in the development of a new European fighter aircraft to be used end of this century: the EFA /European Fighter Aircraft/ program.

Five countries (England, West Germany, France, Italy and Spain) are studying the final specifications of this aircraft and how the tasks will be allocated among them when construction starts. In March of 1985 this study is supposed to be completed. Participants will have to decide whether they want to continue or not.

The final specifications of the new fighter aircraft are not exactly known yet. But because of the many preparatory studies it is possible to indicate which technological developments are likely to be used.

As far as materials are concerned the use of synthetic materials in the next generation of fighter aircrafts will increase to about 50 percent of the total weight resulting in a decrease of the empty weight of 25 percent.

The design of these airplanes will not only be determined by aerodynamics but also by detectability. They want to decrease this considerably, not only the visual detection but especially detection by means of radar and infrared sensors.

This is achieved by avoiding right angles (for example by a gradual transition between wings and fuselage), by using radar-absorbing materials, by adjusting or relocating the air intakes for the engines, by shielding the exhausts of the engines, or by using engines which do not produce smoke.

The new generation of engines is supposed to make it possible for these airplanes to fly supersonically (for instance at 1.8 times the speed of sound; it is not considered to be necessary any more that they fly much faster than that) for quite some time while the afterburner does not need to be used as is the case at present. When the afterburner, which is connected to the actual engine, is switched on, fuel is injected into the hot air stream and ignited. This, the engine capacity is increased; however, this is done at the expense of the fuel consumption so that the afterburner can only be used for a short period.

Therefore, the possibility of flying supersonically without using the afterburner results in a much lower fuel consumption and therefore, a larger range or a longer flying-time. These new engines are also supposed to give these airplanes an even larger acceleration capacity than what the present generation has available. By using revolving engine exhausts it has become possible to take off and land within a limited distance (about 500 m) so that after one's airfields have been bombed, sections of the take-off and landing strips which have not been damaged, can still be used.

Technological developments come so fast that it is imminent that not technology but the pilot will be the restricting factor in this respect. Physical restrictions such as being able to withstand forces of several times the gravity during acceleration and maneuvers, can be taken care of in some way, for example by putting the pilot in a reclining seat (up to about 45 degrees) in the cockpit.

However, problems mainly arise in operating all the apparatus and processing large quantities of information. Both have to be done increasingly faster while time also has to be found to keep an eye on what all is happening outside the cockpit.

That is why in the next generation of fighter airplanes much use will be made of the turbulent, electronic developments which are supposed to result in the completely integrated cockpit. In it, automatic systems, connected to each other by way of some type of electronic spine, take care of steering, navigation, communication, observation and fire control, and of taking electronic counter-measures. The pilot will only see essential information projected on the inside of the glass panel of his cockpit or his visor. He mostly operates everything with two advanced control levers or by giving speech commands.

In the new fighter aircraft the present mechanical and electrical connections, used for piloting, between the control stick and rudder pedals on the one hand and wing and tail ailerons on the other hand, are replaced by digital FBW /fly-by-wire/ or even FBL /fly-by-light/ systems. Apart from a decrease in weight, these systems especially make a big contribution to considerably increasing the maneuverability of these airplanes.

Negatively Stable

Normally speaking planes are negatively stable, i.e., the upward force exerted by the wings, is exerted on a point behind the plane's center of gravity. When the speed is increased, these two points will be more and more apart causing a continuous tendency to somersault in negatively stable airplanes. This can be prevented fairly easily by making the horizontal tail units exert a downward force. These planes are inherently stable and therefore, easily maintain the position in which they have been brought. Therefore, it is fairly safe to fly them.

New fighter aircraft, however, will be positively stable, i.e., the upward force exerted by the wings, is exerted on a point in front of the plane's center of gravity. It is true that when the speed is increased, these two points will come closer together resulting in a decreased tendency of positively stable airplanes to continuously make somersaults.

Yet, these airplanes remain unstable and continuous corrections for piloting the plane have to be made. This correction has to be made so fast and often (in fact continuously) that up to now real as well as automatic pilots have not been considered capable of it. That will change with the introduction of digital FBW or FBL systems and the extremely fast, automatic reactions made possible by it.

Positively stable fighter airplanes have quite a few advantages compared to negatively stable ones. First of all, they require smaller wings while results in lower air resistance and therefore, higher speed. Further, so-called uncoupled maneuvers become possible together with the canards which are being used more and more (in fact, the horizontal tail units, moved from behind to in front of the wings). That means that an airplane can change direction without changing position (or vice versa) as is still necessary. The advantage is that a potential opponent will hardly be able to predict what kind of maneuvers such a plane will make. Also, a target can be spotted for a much longer period.

To which extent all these technological possibilities will be made use of in the new European fighter aircraft, depends on the cost/benefit analyses. A repetition of the F-16 program is to be avoided at all costs. This airplane was developed as a simple, less expensive light-weight addition to the F-15 but in the meantime it is developing into an ever more complex weapon system. In spite of the relatively low initial costs, the total costs are rising quite a bit and will continue to do so.

Therefore, the EFA program will aim at an optimum application of all the technological options without wanting to make it complex.

It remains to be seen whether the cost price per plane will make the eventual purchase of 200 to 250 airplanes, indicated by Secretary of State for Defense Van Houwelingen, possible. Of that cost price, only some tentative--rather optimistic--West German target figures are known but they quickly result in a total purchase price for the Netherlands of way above 15 billion guilders, an amount that, for instance, is more than the total Dutch defense budget for 1985.

12433

CSO: 3614/36

LEADING WESTERN STATESMEN, OFFICIALS QUESTION CREDIBILITY AS ALLY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Nov 84 p 8

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] "It is a question of credibility," says a new report from the Business Policy Forum that is based on a number of talks with leading people in the American Defense and State Departments. The conclusion is that Denmark has lost its credibility.

Denmark must now realize that it has lost its credibility in the area of international security policy. Today this country is regarded as NATO's weakest partner--a partner the allies can no longer depend on. That is one of the conclusions of a report the Business Policy Forum prepared following a number of conversations with leading people in the American Defense and State Departments.

The sharp American criticism is directed primarily against the Danish Social Democrats and their position on nuclear weapons in wartime, times of crisis and peacetime and on the concept of nuclear-free zones. American Undersecretary of Defense Richard Perle put it like this: Saying no to nuclear weapons in wartime makes a Soviet invasion of Denmark in the first hours of a confrontation 100 percent certain.

Perspective Lacking in Debate

The report, which is entitled "A Question of Credibility," was written by the Management publishing firm's foreign policy staff member, Andre Sousann, on the basis of a number of interviews that took place in October and November of this year. The reason they decided to go ahead with the project, according to chief editor Erik Rasmussen, is that so far the Danish security policy debate has lacked international perspective, including the consequences a new Danish position could have on NATO cooperation. The debate seems to have entirely overlooked the more sober considerations of military strategy that dictate Danish security policy. A continuation of the present security policy course could lead Denmark into a credibility crisis that has parallels with the earlier credit crisis, but this one could have even more serious consequences.

Image the Poorest Ever

Erik Rasmussen, who was on a trip to the United States during the past week, said in a telephone conversation with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the report corresponds in every way to the impression he received during talks with American politicians, both members of the Reagan administration and members of the Democratic opposition. "Denmark's image is the poorest it has ever been. The Danes who live in Washington can attest to that," he said.

Among the critics of Denmark's security policy line is former President Carter's security policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of political science at Columbia University, who said: "There is no doubt that the attitude of Danish Social Democrats seriously contributes to the weakening of Atlantic solidarity, but even worse it deters the Soviet Union from negotiating seriously on limitations in the number of nuclear-armed medium-range missiles."

Shutting Ourselves Off

The Pentagon's expert on northern European affairs, Jon Lellenburg, who is more familiar with Denmark than most people, quotes former Defense and Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen's statement that deploying the Pershing missiles was a mistake of historic proportions. "But he forgot to point out that he was a member of the government that made the decision. The only ones who are smiling and rubbing their hands with glee over such statements are the Soviets. How do you expect people to take the Social Democrats seriously?"

The American State Department does not hide the fact that there is a grave risk that Denmark will shut itself off from NATO, the report goes on, quoting two prominent spokesmen for the State Department, John Kelly and James Dobbins. They both say:

"Your influence in NATO has already been reduced substantially. It is up to you to decide whether you want to be part of NATO or not.

"There are now two categories of members, those who shoulder their political, military and economic responsibilities and those who try to evade those responsibilities and use their time to criticize the alliance, among them Denmark and Greece."

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, one of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's close colleagues, added: "This situation is extremely serious and untenable. The Danes should not forget that their security is closely linked to that of NATO and the rest of the world."

Comfortable Dream

Kelly said of the Social Democrats' naive attitude toward the presence of nuclear weapons in Denmark in wartime:

"For centuries Denmark has had the same security problems as Germany and one cannot divide the two. In the event of a conflict, i.e. in the event of a Soviet offensive, tactical nuclear weapons will be used to stop the Russians, whether the Danes approve or not, if NATO considers their use necessary. If one goes so far as to assume that Denmark would be neutral, how could one avoid radioactive fallout in Jutland--since there are nuclear weapons on your joint borders, as you know?"

Helmut Sonnenfeldt added: "Danish Social Democrats can dream that a confrontation would pass by Denmark without disturbing the comfort of the Danes. They should realize that this dream would be interrupted and replaced with a nightmare."

Jon Lellenburg: "They (the Danes) can decide what they want, but there is one thing they cannot change, namely their geography, and believe me that interests Soviet strategists to such a degree that they dream about it day and night." Richard Perle's adviser, Richard Lutwak, added to this:

"If Denmark says no to nuclear weapons in wartime, it will automatically become one of the big nuclear battlefields."

It would be absurd and destabilizing if Denmark agreed to participate in a nuclear-free zone. "Talking about a nuclear-free zone in the age of the SS-20 is an insult to the intelligence," Perle stated. Lellenburg, who is apparently well-informed about the trip Lasse Budtz and Kjeld Olesen made to Moscow, added: "Arbatov, who is the Number 1 Soviet disinformant, was very vague in his replies to their questions. Nothing concrete came out of the visit. The Soviet Union does not negotiate with the weak."

Reinforcements Could Be Withheld

The crisis between Denmark on the one hand and NATO and Washington on the other could, according to sources in the State Department and the Pentagon, lead to a refusal to live up to reinforcement agreements in the event of a confrontation. In that case Denmark would face de facto exclusion. "But in a test of strength between Denmark and NATO, Denmark could not choose neutrality on its own," said Perle, who did not conceal the fact that a popular referendum on Denmark's continued association with NATO would be welcomed. "That would show what the Danish people want. It would also show if all Social Democrats share the view of Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz. We are not so sure about that."

Carrington Agrees

The report is based primarily on the views of American experts but NATO's new secretary general, former British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, expressed himself along exactly the same lines. He said of the Social Democrats' security policy line:

"I believe that if a country adopts such a policy it is the beginning of the end for NATO. It is the same as removing the foundation on which NATO is based."

When asked directly what the consequence of a Danish rejection of nuclear weapons in wartime would be, Carrington said: "The danger of that kind of attitude is that they will end up by excluding themselves from NATO. The consequences of this situation are impossible to grasp."

6578

CSO: 3613/44

SACLANT DEPUTY COMMANDER DEFENDS NEED FOR SUBS IN BALTIC

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Nov 84 p 8

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] A NATO admiral flatly rejects arguments in the domestic debate that submarines have outlived their role as weapons systems.

"A small submarine is one of the hardest targets to find in the Baltic Sea and therefore it is a very effective attack and surveillance platform," said the deputy commander of NATO's Atlantic Command, SACLANT, British Vice Admiral David Halifax, yesterday at a press conference in Copenhagen. He thus flatly rejected arguments in the domestic debate that submarines as weapons have outlived their role because modern technology has made detection all too easy.

"It is correct," he said, "that western technology has come a long way and that one can accurately determine that there is a submarine in a certain ocean area, but it is a long way from that to identifying the position so precisely that one can hit it with a weapon."

Vice Admiral Halifax is visiting Denmark with a number of his staff officers for the purpose of briefing representatives of the Danish government and Folketing on the ability of the Warsaw Pact forces to operate in the Atlantic Ocean and the threat they would be in a war situation to SACLANT's chances of keeping the West European allies supplied with men, materiel and ammunition.

Admiral Halifax pointed out that two areas vital to Denmark, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, lie directly within SACLANT's area of responsibility. He emphasized that it would be a catastrophe for the West if they fell into the hands of the Soviet Union. Therefore there are already allied plans for defending the areas--something Denmark should appreciate, since this is entirely outside the country's own capabilities. The NATO admiral also stressed that during visits to a number of small West European countries he had taken the opportunity to specify the importance of the small NATO fleets.

"We are here first and foremost to prevent war and that is best done through alertness," he said and added: "It is in this area that small local fleets play their most important role. They can move through the waters in question, for example the Baltic Sea, without provoking suspicion and without escalating international tension. The Soviet commercial and fishing fleets are a substantial part of the country's maritime power bid and therefore it is just as important that their ships are kept under constant observation--and this can best be done by local fleets, such as the Danish one, that can move with familiarity in narrow difficult waters."

6578

CSO: 3613/44

NAVY SEEN PERFORMING 'PERFECTLY' DURING SUBMARINE HUNT

High Marks for Readiness

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell praised the navy ships that were moved into position so quickly that they could have prevented a submarine from slipping out of Ise Fjord.

It was quite in line with the navy's assigned tasks that action was taken, Defense Minister Hans Engell said yesterday in the first comment on the submarine hunt in Ise Fjord.

No trace was found of the submarine sighted by two privates Thursday near the rifle range at Jaegerspris, probably because none was there. But there is no doubt that the readiness system is working and the navy ships moved into position so quickly that they would have prevented a foreign submarine from slipping out of the fjord if one had been there.

One of the reasons why the head of SOK [Navy High Command], Rear Admiral Jorgen Bork is so sure that there was no submarine in the fjord is that in the days the navy spent searching not a single vessel was observed that might have served as support for minisub operations in the area--and the presence of such a unit would have been necessary unless this was a suicide action, which nobody believes.

In addition SOK finds it hard to see what interest anyone would have in sending a spy craft into the fjord where the only things of military interest to look at are the target area of the rifle range in the vicinity of Jaegerspris and the torpedo station at Kongsore--both areas that any amateur boatman can easily observe during most of the year.

Effectiveness

In a statement to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE the minister praised the quickness and efficiency with which the operation was launched. He added that he had had

a meeting on Monday with navy leaders where they had reviewed the matter in detail. "It is my opinion that the matter was dealt with correctly and professionally," he said.

"One of the problems that had to be considered, an extremely important problem, was the question of briefing the public through the media. Here we have two things to bear in mind. In the first place we must be careful not to ruin the operation because information is released that should not come out. For this reason some secrecy is an absolute necessity. In the second place, the public should be informed factually and realistically, but without overdramatizing things or creating expectations that are unfounded in reality.

"I think the information obligation was fulfilled this time, but of course we will consider on the basis of this operation whether the job could be done even better if a similar situation should arise," said Engell.

Ships Taking Part

The navy's effort has been praised in several quarters at the expense of the Swedish fleet's many unsuccessful attempts to find presumed Soviet submarines in the archipelago. The background for the distrust of Swedish effectiveness is the fact that for a number of years Swedish defense has allowed the navy to decline for the benefit of the army and the air force. The result is that a number of navy ships that were big enough to carry effective anti-sub equipment have been demolished without being replaced by new, modern units. SOK has been very secretive about the vessels that took part in the search for the suspected submarine. But observations in the search area showed that the search primarily involved the corvette "Niels Juel," supported by some patrol boats of the Damphe class, a minesweeper of the Sund class and at least one torpedo rescue boat from the torpedo station at Kongsore.

The corvette "Niels Juel" is one of the navy's most modern units and was built at Alborg Shipyard in 1978. It is equipped with two diesel engines as well as a turbine, giving it a maximum speed of 30 knots. The weapons consist of one conventional 76 mm cannon, four launching tubes for Harpoon missiles and a number of Sea Sparrow missiles used for repelling airplanes. In addition this ship model is equipped with advanced anti-sub devices that should have made it impossible for a submarine to sneak past it, since at an early point in the search in Ise Fjord it placed itself in the middle of the 10 meter wide and 7 meter deep channel.

Engell's Warning

Both the Daphne craft and the Sund minesweepers have seen a lot of service and are among the craft that will be replaced by the new as yet unbuilt fiberglass Standard Flex 300 within the next few years. But they were quite adequate for a search in Ise Fjord's shallow water, where the best tool for searching for a submarine, according to experienced submarine captains, would be a long stick.

Conditions in Ise Fjord--and in most other Danish fjords--simply cannot be compared with those in the Swedish archipelago with its enormous depths where relatively large underwater craft can easily conceal themselves, secure in the knowledge that sonar echoes from the cliff sides are impossible to distinguish from echoes from a submarine lying quietly on the bottom. Even a small conventional oceangoing submarine would stick up above the surface of Ise Fjord if it tried to lie on the bottom and even a minisub would have to be unusually familiar with the terrain to find a hole in which it could hide.

In general it is more dangerous in other ways for foreign submarines to play hide and seek in Danish waters than it apparently is in Swedish waters.

Defense Minister Hans Engell published new instructions for the navy in "Proclamations on Defense" on 14 May 1984. It said that in the past the purpose of Danish repelling orders was to force a submerged foreign submarine that violated Danish sea territory to surface without damaging it with the intention of expelling it from Danish sea territory.

"But if the craft remains submered it is now clearly announced that after warning signals have been given, armed force should be used to force the craft to come to the surface--if necessary even if this involves a risk that the violating craft might be destroyed."

Possibly First of Many Violations

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Dec 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Search in Ise Fjord"]

[Text] Was there a foreign submarine in Ise Fjord? The question will be asked again and again but it is unlikely that it will be answered. Experiences from the Swedish archipelago and the Norwegian fjords clearly show that it is extremely difficult to identify the objects that seem to be engaged in investigating Scandinavian waters or that are otherwise performing tasks whose details are obscure.

In Norway it is estimated that since 1969 there have been around 100 situations when foreign submarines have violated Norwegian territorial waters. In Sweden there have been a number of dramatic hunts that have made serious violations of international law appear likely. It cannot be ruled out that the power or powers with this burning interest in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the North Sea also penetrate Danish waters on missions that violate Danish territorial rights.

It may seem exaggerated that the Naval Operative Command used so many men and so much materiel during the search in Ise Fjord, since the hunt was started on the basis of very weak indications. But the reaction was not exaggerated. If foreign objects which resemble a submarine are detected on the radar screens that keep watch over our waters, that is the signal to put naval readiness

into action. This must necessarily involve the strength that is available. A search for a submerged submarine is hard to carry out and the possibility of finding it and forcing it up to the surface is not great. But by the very nature of things all means must be tried to achieve a result in spite of the difficulty of the task. The very possibility that there has been a violation of territorial rights is sufficient reason to set in the greatest force possible. If this is not done there is no sense in having a defense system at all.

The submarine hunt could turn out to be an isolated incident. But--again in light of Norwegian and Swedish experiences--it could also be the beginning of more systematic operations in Danish waters. If there really was a foreign submarine in Ise Fjord it is unlikely that this was a unique event. Therefore it is reasonable for Danish defense people to be prepared for the fact that such hunts will be necessary from time to time in the tension-filled waters that surround us.

Any violation of territorial rights is intolerable. No country will tolerate the intrusion of a foreign power where it has no business being. This is just as true of neutral countries as it is for countries that belong to defense alliances. Military readiness is not intended for decoration. It should be used when there is a need for it. There was in Ise Fjord.

Submarine Seen by Fishermen

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 19 Dec 84 p 2

[Text] Holbaek--Three fishermen from Rorvig in northwest Sjaelland say they observed a submarine in Ise Fjord before it was spotted by defense personnel Thursday afternoon.

One of them, Lars Keld Nielsen of Rorvig, said that the three were in Rorvig harbor Wednesday or Thursday morning when they suddenly noticed a mysterious object out on the water.

"We agreed that it was probably a submarine," said Lars Keld Nielsen.

It was just getting light, but according to Lars Keld Nielsen none of the three had any doubt that a submarine was out there in the excavated eastern channel of Ise Fjord.

"The sub had a long 'snout' and a tower. It looked like the other subs we see now and then when we are fishing," said Lars Keld Nielsen.

6578

CSO: 3613/59

DAENIKER ON ARMY SIZE, COST, MATERIEL

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 22 Nov 84 p 39

/Article by Gustav Daeniker: "Many Dwarfs Will Kill Even a Giant--Does the Shortage of Funds Require a Radically New Model of the Army?"

/Text/ The equipment for a modern army is becoming ever more expensive and in its procurement of new weapon systems Switzerland finds itself increasingly at the limit of its financial resources. Marcel H. Kaiser in his Article "The Swiss Mass Army Is Becoming More Expensive All the Time" (WELTWOCHEN No 38) raises the question whether these facts do not call for a radical reorientation of our thinking about the army model: Away from a mass army, toward a small elite troop. Division Commander Gustav Daeniker refutes this thesis in his reply. Daeniker is chief of staff for operational training in the Swiss Military Department.

The author was unlucky. While he praised the infallibility of precision-guided missiles especially in combat against the "armored colossuses" on page 38 of the WELTWOCHEN ("The Swiss Mass Army Is Becoming Too Expensive" /as printed/), another author complained on page 27 of the same edition ("Failing Missiles Have More Frequent Headaches") that the so-called miracle weapons have too many design errors and that industry is often unable to keep its promises to the military.

This small "industrial accident" is typical in a number of ways: Primarily of a dilemma afflicting all military planners from large powers to very small states and also of the fact that hurriedly designed army models--no matter how convincing they may appear to be at first sight--rarely represent the whole truth. An immediate and systematic conversion to something which first emerges as a trend involves risks which no responsible military leadership would find acceptable.

Any new proposal must be evaluated to see whether it adequately addresses the major limiting conditions relative to its scope. We

must not, for instance, lose sight of the fact that the Swiss army has an obligation to contribute to the prevention of war by demonstrating credible strength and that it must defend the country at its borders. A retreat to a redoubt, as carried out in 1940 because of weakness, should be avoided the next time. This also relates to the duties which international law imposes on neutral nations. Neither on the ground nor in the air are we allowed to surrender our territory to the combatants.

Such goals, however, lead to a different type of army from the one that would be needed if for instance "maximizing destruction" of attacking tanks were made the major planning requirement. Goals must nevertheless be weighted against current and future threats which emerge from the combat doctrines and the war potential of foreign powers. In this respect one is all too ready to forget an old danger over a new one. However, trouble is usually cumulative. Tanks and airplanes continue to exist in large numbers; in addition there are improved opportunities for vertical envelopment. Capabilities for indirect acts of war through sabotage and terrorism are growing, while quite generally there is a tendency to strive for quick victory with conventional weapons to avoid resorting to nuclear weapons even the recourse to nuclear weapons remains a distinct possibility.

We must therefore guard against monomania. Anyone who is hypnotized by the threat posed by tanks and wants to subordinate everything to antitank defense will leave gaps in many other areas.

Size Is Our Trump Card

There are still other limiting conditions that need to be considered. The militia system, length of service, and military expenditures are difficult to change but they must not become taboos. When new threats raise doubts concerning our national security goals, these items must also be examined and, at worst, modified.

The model for the army must take all these factors into account. Initially it should be rather like a sharply focused beam with clearly defined contours, later as it develops it will acquire breadth, clearly showing the need for flexible planning and procurement. Sometimes it will even become necessary to accept program changes during particular development phases which in our case comprise one legislative period. We have just experienced this, but such readjustments should be an exception. A broader scope must be applied to such basic questions as those discussed below especially since they are controversial by nature.

That a large army is more expensive than a small one is obvious, but nevertheless a sweeping judgement. A quantitatively smaller army on the whole provides fewer service days. A reduction from the current

625,000 to, let us say, 425,000 men, together with the smaller number of recruits who need to be outfitted, should reduce current annual costs on the average by 100 to 120 million francs. Strictly from a financial point of view an advantage but viewed with the threat in mind a clear disadvantage. Indirect acts of war and potential vertical envelopment call for a large number of soldiers who can provide security for important positions of the civilian-military infrastructure and for key operational areas.

Just at a time when all of our neighbors are looking for better ways of protecting their territory, should we--for the sake of potential savings--voluntarily surrender one of our trump cards by reducing army personnel beyond the reductions which will come anyway because of the declining birthrate? This needs to be carefully thought out.

Some day we may have to distinguish more clearly between combat units with general purpose equipment and units for the security of areas between defensive position. This may bring savings in army materiel, but reliance on reducing the size of the army to make funds available is problematic. There are other ways of saving money which should be exploited first.

If it is true that new technologies can deliver lightweight defensive weapons which would give militiamen a fair chance against modern attack weapons, than the old saying that many dwarfs can defeat giants should not be dismissed lightly.

But even this is only a half-truth. It does not rule out the fact that our army needs high-performance weapons which in turn brings up the question as to which system should be chosen. For example, if antitank defense were the only objective the decision to replace antitank guns with helicopters appropriately equipped with guided missiles could be made quickly, although even here a variety of factors such as the vulnerability of light aircraft in an environment saturated with antiaircraft defenses could not be ignored.

But tanks are more than simply antitank weapons. They will remain characteristic for armies into the next millennium and are therefore important elements of deterrence for us too. They control the battlefield, are capable of recapturing and holding territory and let us not forget that they are the only weapons which can guaranty quick annihilation of hostile airborne troops. Proper combat helicopters can also be considered for such a mission but they have the disadvantage of not always being available.

Tanks are therefore indispensable for maintaining operational freedom of action. Why only the attacking force and not the defenders should be able to employ them successfully is difficult to understand,

assuming that the defenders' mechanized units are supported by the other associated weapons (artillery, military engineers, antiaircraft defense and airplanes).

Not least, we in particular should remember that tanks are not only the actual backbone of the infantry but also an important aspect of morale. The infantry soldier feels secure when friendly mechanized units protect his flanks and his rear; he may also have to rely on them under certain conditions to give him time to get ready for combat. Combat helicopters with their short offensive thrusts and long periods on the ground cannot do this.

This is not a basic argument against helicopters but against scaling back a multi-purpose weapon system for their sake. The ongoing procurement of tanks is therefore basically correct and important despite some of the problems which it also creates. Whether other models will come to the fore by the year 2010 is a speculation which we cannot afford to engage in at this time.

In the same vein we hear already today that money could be saved simply by not procuring any combat aircraft in the 90's. This is of course also true but does not solve problems we have in protecting our neutrality or in defending ourselves. An interdisciplinary analysis, carefully weighing missions and resources, is also needed here.

Under certain circumstances a strong air defense may just be decisive in keeping us out of war altogether. In any case, it gives us the not-to-be-underestimated ability to maintain our neutrality without possibly having to look for outside help. Here too it is not so easy to find the right way and bold moves of the pen are no substitute for all-around defensible planning.

With All Deliberate Speed

In the beginning of the 60's guided antiair missiles were the vogue. Many people thought that they could replace fighters. However, in view of the various tasks that need to be accomplished in airspace, the opinion that both systems are needed prevailed.

This brings us to criticism which today is often based on alternative models. It is usually stimulating and does not by any means arise only after some confidential document has once again managed to find its way into the public domain. The solicitation of suggestions is institutionalized and there are programmed steps for shaping opinions and for planning for the further development of the model beyond the turn of the millennium.

But not every opinion is acceptable. Many of them are at odds with the rhythm of planning. Nonconforming innovations--which cause the

greatest sensation among the public--are usually revolutionary only because they are based on rash assumptions which can rarely withstand the test of careful scrutiny. The more basic problems they can solve without creating new ones, the more seriously they will be considered.

Those who bear responsibility must therefore claim the right to insist on staying with their chosen course because it takes time to arm. Changes in course during a development phase should be restricted to situations in which circumstances require them and when advantageous options can be exercised; they should be kept to a minimum. After all, the logic and substance of new ideas are not lost, they can be applied to future planning phases. Courage can be demonstrated not only by changing one's image but also--despite many temptations--by maintaining an evolutionary approach to a solution which has been selected for the foreseeable future because, at this time, it meets the most important requirements for survival best.

12628

CSO: 3620/146

FIRM FEARS LOSS OF USSR ORDER AS RESULT OF U.S. EMBARGO

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Nov 84 p 7

[Article by B.G. Andersson]

[Text] The construction firm BPA is in danger of losing a significant order to the Soviet Union because of the American embargo rules on high technology. The Russian buyers are threatening to place the order in Finland if the Swedish firm does not deliver "forbidden" American computer equipment.

"The rigid American rules are a big dilemma and they obstruct our efforts to break into the Soviet market," says BPA division chief Nils Sonesson, who is responsible for trade with the Eastern European states.

"This is not the first time that we have been hindered by the embargo. Some time ago we lost an order of over 600 million kronor, partly for the same reason."

The current order, worth about 90 million kronor, involves building an highly automated spare-parts warehouse for Vaz, the Soviet automobile firm. The installation will be erected in Moscow and is intended to improve the possibilities for owners of the Russian Vaz to find spare parts.

Today the spare parts' market is almost chaotic. Many motorists are forced to lay up their vehicle when something breaks, or to buy, for example new spark plugs, on the black market which has sprung up here and there.

If BPA gets to build this pilot plant in Moscow, there is hope for a contract on about 15 similar spare-parts warehouses planned over the whole Soviet Union.

Can Be Blacklisted

The big crux is, however, the data equipment in the highly automated warehouse. The Russian purchasing organization, Autopromimport, wants a duplicate of Saab's big spare parts warehouse in Nykoping which has been studied on the spot. American PDP-II computers with the trade mark Digital Equipment are used there.

Swedish firms may not deliver computers of this type to the East Bloc without special permission from the U.S. government. This way the Americans hope to stop the constant transfer of technology to the Eastern states.

If a firm, nevertheless, delivers without permission computers which are embargoed, it is risking blacklisting and heavy fines. At present the United States is investigating whether ASEA has violated the embargo by making computer deliveries to a decoy company in connection with a 300 million order to the Soviets.

BPA considers it fruitless even to seek permission from Washington. It has instead, in its offer to the Russians, used SM-4 computers, Russian copies of the PDP-II computers.

Finnish Firms

But the Russians do not want to go along with this. Their own computers have less memory capability than the American, and this is of special significance in the projected spare parts warehouse where the computers are to keep in order millions of different items and must be able to find them in a flash.

According to independent judges BPA is best able to take charge of this project. But there are several competitors, among others some Finnish firms.

BPA's negotiators have been reminded repeatedly about the competitive situation. This is naturally a way to increase the pressure on the Swedish firm to finally deliver the sensitive American equipment anyway.

"But we shall never do that. We would rather lose the contract," says Nils Sonesson referring to what has happened to ASEA among other things.

The discussions with the Russians about the spare parts warehouse are at the moment on ice, but Sonesson has hopes that they can start up again.

This is not the first time the embargo has put a monkey wrench in the wheels in BPA's ventures in the Soviet Union. Some time ago it lost the construction of a new freight terminal at Moscow's international airport. It was an order worth over 600 million kronor, one of BPA's biggest ever.

"Here also the Russians demanded American computers which we could not deliver. The order went instead to Finnish firms," Nils Sonesson says.

BPA has also been previously involved in building the airport's traffic-routing system, in which the Swedish Data-Saab was one of the chief suppliers.

But Data-Saab delivered printed circuit cards in violation of the embargo regulations and was recently fined by an American court.

Old Models

Nils Sonesson revealed that BPA is still involved in the construction of the traffic-routing system. Recently it garnered an order involving a new reserve radar installation.

This time the computer deliveries, however, went to an Italian state-owned firm, Selenia, which apparently will supply the Soviet Union with American computers. If Data-Saab had not chosen to give up the Soviet market after the printed circuit cards deliveries, it obviously would have put itself in Selenia's position.

This is not the first example of how companies in 0 countries bring home orders while Swedish firms are compelled to exist on the basis of embargo regulations.

Nils Sonesson is in general very critical in regard to the embargo and asks why the United States cannot accept BPA's deliveries of PDP computers to the Soviet Union.

"It is a five-year old model, and there are already plenty of them in the Soviet Union. What does it matter if they get a few more?" he wonders.

When Undersecretary of State for Foreign Trade Carl-Johan Aberg recently visited Moscow, it was primarily to try to stimulate the sinking Swedish exports to the Soviet Union. A deal for which he put in a plug was exactly BPA's bid regarding the spare-parts warehouse in Moscow.

6893

CSO: 3650/73

INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT LEADERS MEET TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR POWER NEED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Nov 84 p 16

[Text] Industry in Finland is worried about the decision on the fifth nuclear power plant being delayed.

"It is pure fantasy to believe that industry would back a nuclear power plant if we were not convinced that is the best approach economically here. Many detailed studies have demonstrated this, as well as the fact that the four existing reactors have functioned so well," said Director General Krister Ahlstrom at the Energy Day of the Ekono Association of Energy Economy, held on Thursday.

Nearly 300 representatives of, among others, industry, the national Energy Office and the Ministry of Trade and Industry gathered yesterday at the Finlandia House to discuss how the issue of Finland's future energy needs is to be resolved.

Minister of Foreign Trade Jermu Laine warned against abandoning oil as an energy source too quickly.

"If oil consumption continues to decline at the same rate as it has in recent years, we must be prepared for exports to the USSR to drop to a corresponding extent," declared Laine.

Laine also pointed out that a reduction in oil consumption also has an impact on general economic development.

"It would be short-sighted and irresponsible to dismiss the stimulus to growth which trade with the East bloc provides to the national economy," emphasized Minister Laine. He also said that, in addition to increasing other imports from the USSR, an attempt should be made to retain oil imports in view of the fact that the significance of oil imports in East bloc trade should be considered.

"In recent years an attempt has been made more and more to meet Finland's oil demand through purchases from the Soviet Union, so that the high level which has been reached and the 100,000-150,000 jobs affected could be retained. Nearly 90 percent of the value of goods and projects exported to the Soviet Union is now based on oil," said Laine.

According to Laine, approaches should be sought in energy policy which are consistent with this line in foreign trade policy and which at the same time are economically sensible.

The Views of Industry

Fredrik Castren and Director General Krister Ahlstrom presented the views of industry at the energy conference.

Economic development is expected to be faster than the Ministry of Trade and Industry assumed when it projected energy consumption. If the decision on a new nuclear power plant is delayed, we may be forced to adopt expensive interim solutions. More electric power will be needed as early as the beginning of the 1990s, and this may force us to expand coal power in order to make up for the shortfall, said Ahlstrom.

Ahlstrom urged that the energy issue not be viewed solely in terms of energy policy--it also involves laying a secure groundwork for our continued economic well-being; the goals which our society has set are dependent on economic growth.

"No other Western industrialized country is so dependent in its foreign trade on heavy energy-consuming process industry as Finland. Therefore, the availability of energy and its price are of vital concern to Finnish industry. There is, unfortunately, no alternative. Only a profitable, vital industry which is able to develop can make economic well-being possible," notes Ahlstrom.

Despite all efforts at energy conservation, Ahlstrom claims that electricity consumption will increase to a certain extent. More and more the new technology will increase consumption in its own production. An increase in electricity consumption is indicated by both industry's own analyses and by the forecasts of total economic growth. The Ministry of Finance expects that growth will continue at an annual rate of 3 percent up till 1988.

"Even if the rate of growth is 2.5 percent, we will need more electric power capacity at the beginning of the 1990s," said Ahlstrom.

Surprising Growth

The head of the Energy Section of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Taisto Turunen, notes that the prevailing economic situation and the good competitiveness of electric power have had the effect that consumption has increased to a surprising extent in recent years; he believes, however, that this growth will soon drop off.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry is preparing to initiate a new analysis, which is supposed to ascertain whether the sharp increase in the consumption of electricity during the current economic boom should cause adjustments to be made in long-term forecasts as well.

The cooperation group from the utilities has estimated that the total consumption of electric power will increase to 64.4 terawatt-hours in 1995. The most recent forecast from the Ministry of Trade and Industry is 3 tW less.

At lunch Minister of Trade and Industry Seppo Lindblom, defended the energy forecasts which his ministry had made.

"When even the short-term forecasts are at odds with one another, what can you expect from forecasts which extend over a decade? These are no longer forecasts, but rather pictures of the future which contain many different kinds of economic structure assumptions, as well as social evaluations," noted Lindblom.

He said that the assumptions of the Ministry of Trade and Industry concerning future energy consumption wind up somewhere in the middle of the range. The ministry has two alternatives: economic growth will average 2.5 percent per year, or it will be 1.5 percent. The one assumption means that we will need additional capacity at the end of the 1900s, while the other indicates that the [rise in] demand will occur only at the start of the next century.

Lindblom also said that, according to the utilities, there is no time to lose in making the decision for a large-scale power plant, but according to the oil producers there is no hurry at all.

CSO: 3650/100

NAVY TASKED WITH OIL SPILL CLEANUP IN NORTH SEA

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 12 Oct 84 p 8

[Text] Bonn, 11 October--The FRG Navy will shortly be the first NATO fleet to receive a special vessel for use in oil spills. The double-hulled ship, costing DM 12 million, will be financed by the coastal provinces and by the ministries for Transport and for Research and Technology. The navy will provide the crew and the operating budget for the oil spill collecting ship. The "Bottsand" is to be stationed at the Baltic naval base of Olpenitz. When not needed to clean up oil spills, it is to serve for waste disposal of used oil and fecal matter of Federal Navy ships.

The "Bottsand" is a sister ship of the "Thor" which was turned over to a shipping company in Wilhelmshaven. After its baptism on 30 October in Bremen the ship is to be exhibited during the North Sea Protection Conference, to which Federal Minister of the Interior Zimmermann (CSU) has invited his ministerial colleagues from the coastal states. He hopes to obtain an agreement which would generally prohibit the dumping of oil into the North Sea. ~~Great Britain and Norway are also strongly opposed to this.~~ They worry about the tasks which would be required to prevent oil spills at their drilling rigs.

The objection by the minister of finance killed Zimmermann's plans for procuring a fleet of speedboats with helicopter landing platforms for the Border Police Service, for the purpose of improving the surveillance of the North Sea. Other projects, for equipping Border Police helicopters with special reconnaissance instruments, were shelved also. Instead, the Federal Navy will use two of its Do-28 aircraft for patrol flights, starting in 1986. Using radar and TV instruments along with infrared and ultraviolet sensors, they are to hunt for oil violators. In addition, all surface and flying units of the navy have been instructed to plan their movements in a way which will permit the greatest possible observation of any oil spills.

The transport ministry and the navy also want to pool their forces for radar surveillance to avoid tanker accidents off the German North Sea coast. For this purpose, the navy is enlarging its radio relay communications network, so as to transmit a radar image of a transport ministry facility on Helgoland to Wilhelmshaven, where the transport department has installed a "district headquarters." In return, the navy will be permitted to integrate the

Helgoland radar echoes into its military "situation picture." In this manner both departments will be able to save money and manpower.

Studies are ongoing on whether federal navy supply ships could be retrofitted with oil collective devices. If possible, a naval reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft planned for the 1990s is to receive a special oil surveillance sensor package. For reasons of cost and available space, present reconnaissance aircraft cannot be retrofitted.

Special ships and aerial surveillance are part of a long-term environmental protection program of the navy which also provides for the installation of special "waste disposal points" for dirty water, fecal matter and other refuse at its bases. To facilitate the "presorting" of refuse, all waste materials--ranging from folding cardboard cartons to paint buckets--are in the future to be given a "waste disposal number." Beyond this it is forbidden to throw waste overboard, apart from small food leftovers. Among other things, say one reconnaissance expert, this will avoid detection of navy ships by a "long garbage wake in the water," as is the case for ships of the East bloc countries.

9273
CSO: 3620/126

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

22 Jan 1985